

Peacebuilding Compared Project Working Paper 3

Central Sulawesi, Indonesia

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This paper will form the basis for the third substantive chapter of *Peacebuilding Compared: Volume 1: Indonesia*. They are the first of what we hope might build up over 20 years to 50 systematically coded case studies of serious armed conflict around the world. Fieldwork for the paper was conducted by John Braithwaite in Palu, Poso and Tentena in 2007 and in Australia, Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia and telephone interviews in other countries from 2006-2008. Appendix 3.2 summarises the types of people interviewed. We would like to thank Keith Hargreaves and Anjar Kusama Soebari for initial leads to get our interviews moving and the large number of citizens of Central Sulawesi and Jakarta who generously gave of their time and shared their insights in anonymous interviews. Dave McRae generously gave us access to his PhD thesis before it was published. This was helpful as the most detailed piece of work completed on this conflict. Dave McRae and Sidney Jones also provided extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Working Paper, though they bear no responsibility for its deficiencies. Special thanks for all manner of support from my colleagues on the project, Hilary Charlesworth, Leah Dunn, Kate Macfarlane, Charlie Beauchamp Wood and Celeste Ecuyer. We also thank the Australian Research Council for funding this research.

Please feel encouraged to make comments on the paper at our website at <http://peacebuilding.anu.edu.au>. Or by email to John.Braithwaite@anu.edu.au. If you make a significant contribution, this will be acknowledged by footnote or co-authorship where new data and new insights are involved.

Historical Background to the Conflict

The island of Sulawesi was integrated into international trading networks much later than Maluku and North Maluku (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 2*). Islam spread after 1605 from the South Sulawesi kingdom of Makassar. Christianity spread down from the Northern centre of Manado. The more peripheral region of Central Sulawesi, under a mix of these southern and northern influences, came to be a mixed Muslim-Christian population (only 16 per cent Christian (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005: 9), but more equally divided in Poso district (40 per cent Protestant at the end of the New Order), where most conflict occurred. Substantial diffusion of both Islam and Christianity to the centre of the island did not occur until the nineteenth century or later. Coastal people tended to be Muslim, influenced by Muslim sea traders, while mountains folk tended to persist in animist beliefs until Dutch protestant missionaries arrived from the late nineteenth century. Following a bloody pacification campaign in 1905, a large part of the highlands decided as a block to commit to the religion of the Dutch (van Klinken 2007: 73). The Portuguese had been the first colonial power to visit Sulawesi, followed by the Dutch and English. Dutch power on Sulawesi became uncontested during the 17th century, though apart from moments of pacification and the ongoing the work of protestant missionaries, in only limited ways did it shape the

economic and political lives of people at the periphery of the periphery that was the district of Poso.

Central Sulawesi is atypical in Indonesia for being the site of a succession of small scale Muslim-Christian conflicts during the past half century. At first, this was caused by Muslim radicalism moving up from South Sulawesi, then by Christian-led separatism moving down into Central from North Sulawesi. The Darul Islam rebellion for an Islamic state, in opposition to the Republic of Indonesia (1952-1965), was led from South Sulawesi in loose alliance with the Darul Islam movements in West Java and Aceh. Darul Islam was a militarised social movement opposed to the multi-religious republic that Indonesia became. They expanded their influence northwards in part by driving out Christians from the mountains of Central Sulawesi. Permesta was a competing Christian-dominated secession movement from 1957 to 1961 in North Sulawesi. Permesta at times engaged Darul Islam in battle, at other times fought against the Indonesian military. Permesta and Darul Islam even had a period when they fought together for regional autonomy against the military. There were many cleavages in the fighting – Muslim-Muslim as well as Christian-Christian. Locals describe this as the time of gangs (Aragon 2001: 52). This meant that not only was there a legacy of Muslim-Christian distrust, but distrust across other inter-village fault lines as well. Christians in the Poso Lake region were originally pleased to have Christian Permesta forces drive out Darul Islam. But when Permesta militias mistreated locals, a highlands militia called the Youth Movement of Central Sulawesi (GPST) was formed to drive them out. GPST was the name was appropriated by those forming a 1998 Christian militia.

Occasional but minor outbreaks of Christian-Muslim violence was iteratively part of the landscape of Suharto's New Order in Central Sulawesi between 1965 and 1998 (see, for example, Aragon 2000: 316). Between 1988 and 1998 there were a number of Muslim-Christian clashes and clashes between local and migrant Muslims in the provincial capital Palu, Poso and transmigration sites (Harwell 2000: 204; Human Rights Watch 2002: 6; Tamagola 2003: 1). A Palu resident said of conditions before the major outbreak of post-New Order violence on 24 December 1998 that 'There was no smoke yet, but there were embers' (Human Rights Watch 2002: 6). Veitch (2007: 122) argues that 'the history of Muslim activism in South Sulawesi continues to influence what happens in the region through movements such as the KPSI (Komite Penegakan Syari'at Islam [Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law]) and its militant wing Laskar Jundallah. The crisis in Poso and Tentena owed as much to the activities of this group and its allies such as Laskar Jihad as it did to long-standing religious tensions between Muslim and Christian and the earlier influence of Darul Islam.'

While the violence in Central Sulawesi caused considerably less loss of life than our last case in North Maluku, it is a much higher profile case because it had that pre-history since the 1950s of Christian-Muslim violence, because it started earlier than North Maluku and really persisted as a serious problem until 2007. Moreover, because it persisted for so long after September 11, 2001, and because Central Sulawesi was for part of that period a significant training centre for mostly local, but some international, jihadists, it attracted attention and concern from the United States and other Western powers. Like Maluku, and unlike North Maluku, Laskar Jihad landed in significant numbers from Java to level Christian churches and villages in

Central Sulawesi. The Laskar Jihad numbers were not as large as in Maluku, however, and other jihadist groups did most of the fighting on the Muslim side. Also like Maluku, most outside jihadists returned to their villages in Java and elsewhere when religious, adat and political leaders, Javanese and local, pleaded for this. In some cases religious leaders flew in to Poso to do so (Police interviews). But a rump of hardliners stayed and continued to execute regular bombing incidents (almost every day in the final months of 2006 according to one police intelligence officer, somewhat less frequently than this according to local journalists) until January 2007. In 2004 a stash of no fewer than 123 home made bombs had been discovered, perhaps evidence of preparation for this escalation (Sangadji 2004c).

Immigration

By the 1990s government transmigration programs to move people from overpopulated parts of Indonesia, plus voluntary immigration, had seen many of the key niches in Central Sulawesi's poor economy become dominated by immigrants, especially Bugis (from South Sulawesi), Chinese, but also immigrants from North Sulawesi and Arabs. As in Ambon, the Dutch had favoured Christians for employment in the colonial civil service in Sulawesi. But especially after Suharto steered Indonesia toward its Islamic turn in the 1990s, Christians in Poso looked on with concern as Muslims eroded the advantages they had enjoyed in education and government jobs.

At the time the conflict started, Poso district had the highest proportion of migrants of any district in Central Sulawesi (van Klinken 2007: 73) and the migrant share in the population of Central Sulawesi was 18 per cent compared to 10 per cent nationally (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005: 26). Until the late 1990s, Poso district had a majority Protestant population, but by 2002 Protestants were down to 40 per cent (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005: 26). Because almost all the migrants were Muslim, migrant-indigenous conflict over land, jobs and other resources could be, and was, interpreted as religious conflict. As in North Maluku (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 2*), while migrants, especially transmigrants, relied upon Indonesian state land law to argue that the land on which the state wanted them to settle became theirs, locals saw ownership in terms of indigenous land law and custom. An example of how disputes arose was when transmigrants were settled on agricultural land that indigenous farmers had temporarily left fallow. Mostly land conflict was about expansionary entrepreneurial migrant cash-croppers encroaching on subsistence indigenous cultivation. Migrant logging entrepreneurialism on indigenous land was another tension. McRae (2008: 81) concludes that religion became the primary cleavage in the conflict but that in the third, most bloody, phase of the conflict in May-June 2000 indigene-settler resentment was also significant as manifest in the ethnic Pamona graffiti 'Pamona Poso my birth land, indigenous people of Poso unite'. As in Maluku and North Maluku, Pamona combatants at times headed toward battles singing 'Onward Christian Soldiers'.

Political Uncertainty

The end of Suharto's New Order meant potentially a particularly big change in a province like Central Sulawesi that had always been viewed as politically unstable and therefore was ruled at both senior and intermediate levels of governance with top-

down tightness by dependable military appointments. The violence erupted in Central Sulawesi during an extended period when it was unclear what form the new democracy promised by *reformasi* would take at the provincial and district level. 'Everyone knew that the rules had changed, but no one knew precisely what the new rules were'. Such a context 'radically skewed the "opportunity structure" in favour of political entrepreneurs not averse to risk-taking' (van Klinken 2007: 74).

The view of the head of police intelligence was that political uncertainty was not only a matter of what the new rules were. There was uncertainty about how very settled rules of criminal law would be enforced in practice. Both early and late in the conflict, in his view, there were key political leaders who were the subject of major investigations for massive embezzlement of government funds. It suited them to politicise the criminal justice process, to be able to argue that Christian provocateurs were trying to set them up because they were standing up for the political rights of Muslims.

As a result of the strong traditions of military rule of the province, political party organization, indeed any kind of political organization, was stunted. The most mature and influential organizations available to be harnessed by political aspirants, or simply to be networking sites for them, were religious, as actually was true of small town social organization throughout Indonesia (van Klinken 2007: 77). The political aspirants who enrolled religious organizations to their projects were themselves enrolled by competing business interests in Poso town. The dominant powerbrokers here were on the one hand Chinese Christian merchants and on the other Bugis Muslim businessmen. They funded political champions who they hoped would deliver them privileged access to government contracts.

Describing the Conflict

Major Fighting Begins

The triggering incident occurred on Christmas eve 1998, which fell that year in the fasting month of Ramadan. A riot in Poso town developed from an incident in which a Protestant youth stabbed a young Muslim in the arm. The incident came to be given a religious meaning. Because alcohol was involved in it, Christian and Muslim leaders agreed to ban alcohol during Ramadan. Police started to seize liquor to enforce this, but trouble escalated from Muslim vigilante actions against Christian Chinese shops alleged to be selling alcohol. On 27 December 1998, Herman Parimo, a district assembly member, trucked his GPST Christian youth militia from Tentena into Poso town (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005: 13-14). Hundreds of Muslim youth, many of whom had also been trucked in, clashed with them. Two hundred people (mostly Protestants) were injured in a week of rioting and looting and 400 Protestant and Catholic homes and some Muslim ones burned, as well as some Christian stores according to Brown, Tajima and Hadi (2005: 14). McRae (2008: 3) has the lower estimate of 80 injured. One man was doused in petrol and set alight (McRae 2008: 46). There was torture, dragging people by rope from a vehicle, many terrifying incidents, but no one was killed. Parimo and seven other Protestants, but no Muslims, were imprisoned. Parimo's sentence was 15 years. Naturally, in circumstances where most of the victims were Protestants, feelings of injustice and anger welled up in the Protestant community. Major General Marasabessy, who announced these arrests on

30 December 1998 was a close ally of General Wiranto, a national player with a keen eye to the Islamization of politics occurring in this period.

Muslims believed that Parimo was a politician playing the religious card in the lead up to an election. Parimo was aggrieved that a Protestant colleague, Yahya Patiro, did not appear likely to be nominated for bupati of Poso District. During the New Order there had been conventions about Christian and Muslim turn-taking and a balance of roughly equal numbers of Muslims and Christians in top positions in Poso district government.¹ To Christians like Parimo, non-succession of Patiro from number two to number one, with the retirement of a Muslim bupati, would bode a breakdown of balance, a Muslim grab for political power in the unsettled conditions after the fall of Suharto's New Order. McRae (2008: 64) concludes that 'While we cannot discount a simple political miscalculation on his part, I would suggest that we can better explain Parimo's actions as motivated by a sense of indignant anger at a perceived affront rather than by any expectation of political gain'. Patiro was vilified by banners around Poso after the riot. He fled town and when he tried to return to salvage his reputation and future political aspiration he was driven out by a mob. 'By this stage, political aspirants in Poso must have thought violence to be a most useful tool' (McRae 2008: 52). Notwithstanding unresolved tension over the politics and the justice of the law enforcement, the June 1999 elections by the district legislature were held without violence. A Muslim who at least had not been a protagonist in the violence became bupati. But the compromise candidate left both the Muslim and Christian political factions and their business patronage networks dissatisfied, nay furious.

April 15, 2000 saw another fight, another alleged stabbing of a Muslim youth² by a young Protestant and the second wave of major rioting in the aftermath. Escalation included groups of youth firing arrows at each other. This lasted until May 3. Muslim youths roamed Poso town in search of young Protestants, burning 130 houses (many of them rebuilt after the 1998 riot), shops, two churches, and three schools (McRae 2008: 59) chasing the Protestant and Chinese communities into the hills. Muslim lobbyists had warned the Governor, a warning repeated in the Palu daily newspaper, that if he did not appoint the man who had been their preference for the position of bupati, Damsyik Ladjalani, to the number two position in Poso (district secretary), rioting would break out again. It was when the governor appointed an apolitical Muslim bureaucrat that the promised rioting did break out (van Klinken 2007: 82).

The vacillating response of the security forces allowed such a level of escalation to occur. A Brimob (police mobile) riot control unit arrived quickly from the nearby capital of Palu, but in the process of attempting to secure order they shot and killed three Muslims, incensing their community, causing attacks on the homes of police officers and a police station. Pressure on the governor from the dominant Muslim political elites resulted in the Brimob unit being withdrawn to Palu. It was after this withdrawal that the arson and violence really got out of hand. Again Christian and

¹ Vice President Kalla argued in 2007 that the Poso conflict had been caused by unsettling the political balance of a Christian regent complemented by a Muslim deputy, and vice versa: 'In that case, there was harmony, but when democracy set in, suddenly, the winner decided to take all' (Suwarni 2007).

² The Muslim youth was later convicted for provoking violence by pretending to have been stabbed when he was not (McRae 2008: 61).

Muslim fighters brandishing machetes were trucked into Poso town for the fray. Finally, 600 soldiers arrived from South Sulawesi and restored a temporary order by 3 May 2000. But there were some further outbursts of Muslim-dominated violence and further limited law enforcement that Christians felt granted impunity to Muslims. Agfar Patanga, who was regarded by Christians as the main Muslim provocateur, had been arrested well before the April 2000 violence and subsequently sentenced to a short prison term. However, he never served the prison time. His release was one of the demands of Muslim leaders at the same time the demand had been made for the Brimob withdrawal (Sidel 2006: 163). Fighting escalated when these demands were initially rebuffed, though in this wave of the fighting not many more than ten (mostly Protestants) were killed (Sidel 2006: 163). The scene had been set for Christian vigilantism to replace public justice with private revenge.

What seemed the inevitable Christian retaliation of the third wave of the conflict came on 23 May 2000. ‘Many Christians describe the May-June violence as “revenge” (pembalasan) for the earlier attacks on Christians, but it is also common for them to describe it as “defending our territory” (mempertahankan kita punya wilayah)’ (McRae 2007: 84). For a month, Christian militia had been training at a camp in the highlands with assistance from retired military officers (Aragon 2001: 70). About a dozen Christian ‘ninjas’ cloaked in black planned to target Muslims they believed were responsible for the recent violence. While the attacks were bungled and foiled, three Muslims were killed in the process. In the following weeks there were counter-attacks by Muslims, but most of the violence was organized by various Christian militias against Muslims. This time it was not restricted to Poso town, spreading to villages across the district, continuing into July 2000. Between 300 and 800 died, mostly Muslims according to Brown, Tajima and Hadi (2005: 15) and Aragon (2001: 47). By July 2000, Poso was virtually empty, a ‘dead city’ (Aragon 2001: 47). There were many atrocities by the Christians, including cases of Muslim men who surrendered being killed and women sexually assaulted (Human Rights Watch 2002: 17). The fighting was finally quelled with an additional 1500 soldiers complete with ten tanks and elite Brimob units from Java. By this stage Laskar Jundullah from South Sulawesi was actively involved in the fighting (Veitch 2007: 130). The successor to Parimo as the Christian militia commander, was his brother-in-law, Al Lateka. He was shot dead on 2 June 2000 (McRae 2008: 113). Tungkunan, a retired military officer was his replacement, with Fabianus Tibo one deputy. Tibo was later arrested and sentenced to death with two colleagues for his alleged role, among other crimes, in the murder of 80 or more unarmed Muslims on 28 May 2000 who were sheltering in the grounds of a boarding school, an atrocity that attracted national publicity (van Klinken 2007: 83). In July 2000, 124 Christians suspected of Christian militia violence were arrested (Aragon 2001: 70).

Jemaah Islamiyah and Mujahidin Kompak sent some trainers to Poso after June 2000 and an Al-Qaeda organizer from Spain in October (van Klinken 2007: 84; ICG 2005b). In addition to at least five local Muslim militias, by 2001 other imported militias included Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Wahdah Islamiyah, Laskar Bulan Sabit Merah and Laskar Khalid bin Walid (ICG 2005b: 11). Because Laskar Jihad was better at national self-promotion than the other groups, much popular commentary on Poso give Laskar Jihad more of the credit for the chaos than it deserved. Mujahidin Kompak referred to them as ‘Mujahidin Pilox’ (spray paint warriors) because they would allegedly bring up the rear in fighting carrying spray cans to write ‘Laskar

Jihad Poso' on the ruins of buildings others had captured (ICG 2005b: 14). Laskar Jundullah was the largest importer of outside fighters into the conflict, contributing 2000 according to Conboy (2006: 100), a number that is probably too high.

Pause, Resumption, Pause, Resumption

During August 2000 there were very ineffective top-down reconciliation efforts by the Governors of the three Sulawesi provinces that gave inadequate assurances to IDPs that they could return to their homes in safety. There was an adat peace ceremony attended by President Wahid that included burying of a buffalo head to signify burying the enmity. Some jeered during the ceremony (McRae 2008: 120). Nationally, Jemaah Islamiyah was still seeking to rekindle a climate of religious war. On the night of 24 December, 38 JI bombs exploded in churches spread across 11 cities of Indonesia during Christmas eve services (Conboy 2006: 127).

Low-level violence continued in Poso until another escalation of the violence occurred in June 2001, further escalated with the arrival from Java of 100-150 Laskar Jihad fighters in July 2001 (see *Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 2* and Hasan (2006) on their genesis and recruitment).³ By this time most of the Laskar Jihad fighters who had been in their successful Maluku campaign had left and peace had returned to North Maluku. This was the second wave of Laskar Jihad muscle flexing that was a deep worry for President Wahid. It was destabilizing of his Presidency that the security forces allowed them to embark for Poso against his explicit instructions. Automatic weapons that neither side had up to that point were introduced in the June-July 2001 escalation. Several weapons were from a police armoury in Ambon city ('Poso Weapons Come from Ambon: BIN', *Jakarta Post*, 15 July 2005) and some from the Southern Philippines (Jakarta Post 2003). Laskar Jihad attempted, without success, to take over the coordination of all Muslim militias as they had done in Maluku. Nevertheless, the chaotic diaspora of jihadist militias got the better of Christian fighters from July 2001. Many Christian villages were overrun and burned to the ground. 2,400 houses were razed in 124 incidents in this new phase of the fighting and 141 killed, with at least 27 missing (Human Rights Watch 2002: 20). As in Maluku, the casualties in the phase from July-December 2001 were fewer because Christian forces knew they stood no chance of winning against the well armed jihadist forces and usually chose to flee rather than fight (McRae 2008: 127). By the end of 2001 there was concern in Jakarta about the international repercussions of an impending full-scale Muslim assault on Christian Tentena and at the display of Osama bin Laden posters at some mujahidin checkpoints on the road to Tentena (Veitch 2007: 132).

Again, there was initially political paralysis in mobilising the security forces to stop the arrival of outside mujahidin. Provincial and district leaders held meetings with them, even gave speeches welcoming the improvement Laskar Jihad might bring to

³ Kingsbury (2005: 143) says 3000 Laskar Jihad fighters returning from Maluku arrived in Poso. Human rights Watch (2002: 11) reported an estimate of 2000, Hasan (2006: 218) 700, and Erik W (2002) 450. Sidney Jones (personal communication) thinks all of these estimates are too high with Laskar Jihad never having more than a few hundred on the ground at any time and Laskar Jundullah having more imported fighters, but never as many as 1000.

security against provocateurs, and the security forces did not initially stand in the way of their marauding through Christian villages with other outside and local jihadist militias. This climate changed sharply in November 2001 when a Spanish judge stated that there was an al-Qaeda terrorist ‘training camp’ in Poso. By early 2002 there were 2500 police and 1600 military deployed in Poso (McRae 2008: 184). The commander-in-chief of the US Pacific command then visited Indonesia specifically expressing concern about Poso and possibly showing Indonesian intelligence chief Lt Gen Hendropriyono CIA photos of the alleged Poso training camps (van Klinken 2007: 86). Sceptics suspected Indonesian opportunism to turn the tap of American military aid on again, but van Klinken concludes that the subsequent evidence suggests ‘there really had been such camps’ (van Klinken 2007: 86) and indeed some al-Qaeda training money may have flowed to Poso (Conboy 2006: 160). A subsequent arrest in the Philippines provided some corroboration of the Spanish evidence; the Washington Post reported unidentified intelligence officials in 2002 alleging that a Poso training camp was attended by ‘two dozen Philipinos from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, several Malaysians from the Malaysian Mujaheddin Group and “scores” from the Middle East, Europe and North Africa’ (Human Rights Watch 2002: 13). The reality of some internationalisation of the Poso terrorist training of course does not warrant a conclusion that al-Qaeda was in any way involved in planning the Poso conflict. It wasn’t.

Malino I

The result of the Spanish revelation was that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, at that time Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, initiated a further injection of fresh troops and police and coordinated a willingness on their part to confront attacks. Weapons were to be confiscated and outsiders persuaded, or forced if necessary, to return to their homes. A peace conference on 19-20 December 2001 paved the way for the Malino peace accord. Weapons confiscation, increased effectiveness of the security forces and war weariness created a climate for peace (Brown and Diprose 2007: 9). Secret meetings of senior ministers with the most militant commanders, elite political backers and business financiers from both sides (separately) in Makassar also paved the way to Malino. At least some of the most central of the key actors in the conflict actually signed the agreement. Unlike the previous four failed signed peace agreements between political, adat and religious leaders since 1998, field commanders of militias from the two camps signed Malino (Jupriadi 2001; Jupriadi and Erik W 2001). A most interesting development was that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the highest profile organizational supporter of terrorism in South-East Asia, and an exporter of fighters into Poso, supported the Malino agreement, ‘arguing that peace would be a better environment for mission work than war’ (van Klinken 2007: 86). There was perhaps a mix of stirrings toward a non-violent change in position among many jihadist factions at this time and dissembling by others that took account of the pressures Jakarta was under from the US. This was almost a year before the Bali bombing was inspired by the Noordin Mohammed Top/Hambali/Mukhlis faction of JI that rejected the evolving mainstream view of the organization that terrorist violence within Indonesia now jeopardised their capacity to proselytise. One signatory of the Malino agreement, Jono Priyandi, was imprisoned for bombing four Protestant churches in Palu within two weeks of the signing (ICG 2005b: 16).

The alleged founder of Laskar Jundallah was arrested in March 2002 (Sidel 2006: 213), as was the founder of Laskar Jihad in that year. Some Mujahidin Kompak fighters (spawned by JI but organizationally distinct from it) did not return to their homes in compliance with the Malino accord. They rejected Malino because their demand for prosecution of the Christian leaders of the atrocities of May-June 2000 was not an explicit part of the agreement. They continued more sporadic attacks on Christian villages, for example in October 2003 when 13 Christians were killed. This was also true of a small hard core of Laskar Jihad fighters who stayed behind. Most of these were split off from Laskar Jihad by JI according to police intelligence sources. One JI and Laskar Jihad strategy was for operatives from outside the province to marry a woman who had lost a husband or and/or other relatives to Christian militias. That conflict-affected family would then become a base for JI education through videos, books, religious schools. Most of the worst atrocities committed by Poso JI members since Malino have been by men who lost family members, in one prominent case 35, before Malino. Police admit to 19 bombing incidents in Poso in 2003 (ICG 2005b: 22); there also may have been 19 shooting incidents (Sidel 2006: 166) and some attacks on villages. Those wanting to reignite conflict also engaged in random ride-by hacking attacks on citizens with machetes. In 2004 there were two incidents of Christian ministers being assassinated in front of their congregations. The incident that attracted international attention was three Christian schoolgirls who were beheaded in 2005. While sadism in Poso did not reach the heights of excess of North Maluku, even in a sermon at a funeral for victims of the murder of women and children in the Buyung Katedo massacre, we see either a pathologically sadistic reality or a pathologically sadistic imagination, or a mixture of both⁴: ‘Truly Christians...have acted cruelly towards us ya Allah. They have murdered and chopped up our children, they have slit open the bellies of our women, taken out their foetuses and replaced them with young pigs’ (McRae 2008: 154). In October 2006 the head of the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church was assassinated. The war had at least shifted from mass terror to more targeted, vivid and sporadic terror, though one bomb in the marketplace of Christian Tentena killed 22 in 2005.

While a steady flow of mainly Christian death and injury did continue, it is also true that a sharp downshift in the violence occurred after Malino. In the six months after Malino, religious leaders from both sides went from village to village assuring people that Malino’s security assurances would hold, that they could hand in their weapons. Peace sermons were important. It was in the second half of 2002 that socialization moved from leaders holding peace meetings with their own faithful to local reconciliation meetings involving both Christians and Muslims. Clashes between communities mostly ended. Jihadist strategists adapted to the fact that people were fatigued from fighting (McRae 2008: 229) by shifting mostly to terrorist bombings, targeted murders and random shooting. Most Laskar Jihad and other imported fighters did return home as a result of Malino, though mostly months later than agreed. After the Bali bombing in October 2002, Laskar Jihad completely disbanded. Late in 2003, 18 members of Mujahidin Kompak were arrested in connection to the October 2003 violence against Christians and in March 2007 Poso JI leader Hasanuddin was sentenced to twenty years prison for planning the beheading of the three Christian schoolgirls in 2005 (ICG 2007 b: 12).

⁴ This is our interpretation rather than McRae’s (2008).

Quite regularly, less deadly bomb attacks, many simply targeting Christian buildings, persisted until January 2007. Between the Malino accords coming into effect in 2002 and January 2007, Poso remained a kind of flickering flame for the most radical advocates for an Islamic state. It was fertile ground for them. This was because many local Muslims continued to be livid that the alleged protestant leaders behind the violence were not convicted. From a Christian point of view this seems perverse because until late 2003 Muslim perpetrators of violence enjoyed impunity, while many Christians went to prison. Three Christian leaders were also executed. All this was a sharp contrast to North Maluku where all Christian (and all Muslim) leaders enjoyed amnesties when they had perpetrated much worse atrocities (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 2*). The difference was that Fabianus Tibo, one of the three executed Christian militia leaders, named a list of 16 prominent Christians, including senior civil servants and retired military officers, who he claimed were the real leaders behind the Christian violence of May-June 2000. It was the persistent demands for the arrest of these 16 who had been named by a Christian commander that struck a responsive chord with many grieving Muslim families.⁵

So extremism continued to flourish, indeed grow, in Poso mid-decade, even as fatalities fell. The International Crisis Group (2008) estimated that 200 JI religious teachers had been attracted to Poso. Police intelligence sources said to us that there was significant JI membership (not necessarily engaged with terrorism) in every subdistrict of Poso. The police believed a local crime problem had emerged of JI using robberies to support their activities. Other crimes, including murder by beheading, was conducted to create the appearance of religious crime when in fact it was probably organized crime (or murder to eliminate an insider who knew too much about political corruption (Sangadji 2004d)). Unlike other conflict areas, there was no morphing of combatant organizations into drug-running organized crime groups, however. JI succeeded in reproducing a climate of intimidation and political quiescence in the Central Sulawesi Christian community. In Palu, as in Poso, in mid-2007 all the Christian churches on a Sunday still had armed security personnel at guard posts inside the church grounds. This does make a fearful context for entering a place of prayer.

The Hold-Outs: Carrots, Sticks and Religious Reasoning

The law enforcement tide began to turn sharply during 2006 when information from arrests allowed the police to compile a list of 29 jihadists responsible for much of the terror in Poso since 2003. A human rights team was despatched to Poso to monitor the police tactics in bringing the 29 to justice, an extraordinary gesture of sensitivity to the prospect of procedural injustice reigniting violence (Tauran 2007). Violence had spiked up from September 2006 when the three Christian combatants were finally executed following two delays prompted by protests from supporters. The 29 were heavily armed. The police wanted to avoid a pitched battle with them. So for many months it sought to persuade them to surrender, using religious leaders respected by the terrorists as intermediaries. Actually this was a continuation of a longstanding effort of enrolling major Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, the Indonesian Ulama Council and even former Laskar Jihad leaders to the

⁵ Three of the 16 were sentenced to short prison terms on charges unrelated to the allegations Tibo made against them (Human Rights Watch 2002: 44).

project of persuading hardliners to renounce violence voluntarily rather than through imprisonment.

Several ultimatums to surrender communicated through respected adat and religious leaders, including the head of the Islamic Defenders Front from Jakarta, did persuade at least five to give up without a fight. On 11 January an opportunity arose to surround a house where some of the ringleaders of the ongoing violence were believed to be together. One JI leader, Ustadz Rian was shot dead when, according to the police, he emerged on the scene carrying a bomb. Another on the list of 29 was killed and two arrested. The surviving mujahidin in the Tanah Runtuh area then established roadblocks preparing for the final police assault to capture them. They were joined by militants from other mujahidin groups who were prepared to defend them. When the police arrived on 22 January 2007, they immediately drew fire. Seven police officers were hit; one died. In the firefight that ensued, 13 militants were killed (ICG 2008: 2), and dozens were arrested. In the following days many others either surrendered or were rounded up. But by the end of 2007 nine of the original 29 suspects were still at large. According to Sidney Jones (2008), five of them fled to Java and went underground. At least one seems to have fled to Mindanao in the Philippines. The arrests also led to information that allowed JI leader arrests in other parts of Indonesia. Two Mujahidin Kompak (by then called Mujahidin Kayamanya) were killed and two were sentenced to prison terms for their role in the January 22 2007 shootout with the anti-terrorism police (ICG 2008: 4-5). Bomb explosions ceased for months after it, and there was no serious incident of religious violence in the next year. These operations have also allowed the police to redeem their reputation. As of 2008 'the perpetrators of all the jihadi crimes committed since the 2001 Malino peace accord have been identified, and most have been arrested, tried and convicted, without any backlash' (ICG 2008: 1).

We cannot be certain whether this will prove another lull in a storm that will resume because underlying senses of injustice prevail. One basis for hope is that there is so little support for terrorism now in a Poso Muslim community who are fed up with bomb explosions and murder. Another is that the JI leadership has now decided that they should restrict their activities to purely religious work in Poso. Before the final 22 January 2007 assault, the locals were wanting to surrender, while the JI leaders who came from Java urged them to hold out.

The January 2007 assault was part of an iron fist and velvet glove strategy. The enforcement paradigm shift was to offer the jihadist hold-outs of Poso an alternative master status to 'hard-line terrorist'. They were proffered the alternative identity of 'ex-combatant'. Actually, they had only been labelled terrorists for the first time immediately after the September 11 2001 attack on New York, before which they had been labelled 'provocateurs' (Human Rights Watch 2002: 12) or 'mujahidin'. Especially after they saw in January 2007 that a terrorist identity might lead to a sticky end, the ex-combatant identity proved attractive to many of the hardliners from Poso and some from Java. To get the benefit of the ex-combatant identity, they were expected to do more than just desist from violence. They were supposed to publicly and actively denounce violence as the path of jihad. When they did that, they got reintegration benefits akin to those provided to former GAM members in the war in Aceh or to Free Papua Movement members who came in from the jungle to renounce insurgency. Vocational training, for example in automotive mechanics and furniture

making, tools and small amounts of capital to start up businesses were among the things provided to the newly redefined ex-combatants. The International Crisis Group (2008: 5) shows the relevance of this by describing the life circumstances of the 21 hold-out members of Mujahidin Kayamanya in 2007 – nine unemployed, three fishermen, two students, two fish traders at Poso market, the rest all in unskilled jobs.⁶ ‘For some of these fighters, both local and non-local, the combination of military training and active combat may have been the most meaningful experience in their lives’ (ICG 2005a: 3). When ‘ex-combatants’ were serving prison time in Jakarta, relatives in Poso, sometimes more than a dozen of them, were flown at the state’s expense to Jakarta to reintegrate them into a post-terrorist life and urge them to resist the pressure from hardliners inside and outside the prison.

Some ‘ex-combatants’ have received cash grants rather than vocational and in-kind reintegration assistance. These have been the less successful cases according to ICG (2007a: 5). It finds the program ‘hit-and-miss, backed by large amounts of money, mostly channelled through the coordinating ministry for people’s welfare’ (ICG 2008: 5). Yet all counter-terrorism is hit-and-miss and the benefits we hear beneficiaries to receive mostly amount to a three figure sum (in US dollars) and rarely, if ever, a five figure sum. So this seems one of the cheaper campaigns waged at one of the more significant nodes of the war on terror. On the other hand, a former Mujahidin Kompak criminal like Sofyan Djumpai has been graced with many contracts with the Poso district government to reward his role in leading young men into the reintegration program, and this might have an indeterminably large cost to the public purse (ICG 2008: 6). The Poso police have also been worried about the effect on the integrity of government contracting of large numbers of former preman (semi-organized criminals) who joined mujahidin organizations seizing the opportunity to be reintegrated into contracting businesses. The worry that such a program rewards violence is greater if it is thought likely there will be a repeat cycle of violence – such that terrorists might see themselves as having hope of getting another reward when another bout of violence breaks out. Sidney Jones and the International Crisis Group wisely point out that because such programs can be a moral hazard, they need to be continuously and independently evaluated.

Then again, as the ICG also points out, some of the NGO initiatives associated with this program have built reconciliation through forging cross-communal economic links. The police prudently decided, acting on advice from NGOs, that the reintegration program might have more legitimacy if it were not run by them. They contracted an NGO called Training a Self-Sufficient Nation (YB2M), who successfully argued it would be a mistake to exclude Christians from the program:

One of the first to apply was Andi Bocor, who had also been the first on the DPO list to turn himself in, in November 2006. His proposal involved setting up a fish trading company with seventeen others, all considered ‘potentials’ [potential future terrorists]. The police suggested adding three others, Bocor agreed, and YB2M found them a used fishing boat for approximately \$8,500...

⁶ In contrast, Hasan’s (2006: 162) interviews with mainstream Laskar Jihad recruits in Java indicated that almost half of them were current students of Javanese universities, drop outs from university or graduates.

One [Christian group of potentials] proposed a pig-raising project; Syarifudin [of YB2M] convinced them to change it to fish-raising. Pigs would have been more lucrative, but cooperation with Muslims would have been impossible. With fish he saw the possibility of linking it up with Andi Bocor's project, so the Christian fish-farmers could market their goods through the Muslim traders. This may prove unrealistic, but it is innovative, long-term thinking (ICG 2008: 6-7).

A more expensive aspect of the counter-terrorism push in Poso has involved millions of dollars building a large world-class Islamic school that would undercut the influence of the Pesantren captured by JI. A delicate diplomacy of luring the local religious leadership away from the radicalising schools (and ultimately closing them), and to the new deradicalizing elite school, is underway (ICG 2008: 8-9). So is a diplomacy of balanced support for new Christian educational investment in Poso.

The Poso reintegration initiatives are part of a wider pattern of reintegrative response to Indonesian terrorism in recent years. Basically this approach involves treating terrorists with kindness in prison, engaging them in a community of dialogue with respected salafi religious leaders and former terrorists who have renounced violence. There are carrots as well – visits funded to prison for far-away relatives, trips to Mecca, early release, funding to start businesses, school fees for children – for those who become part of the program to persuade others to renounce violence. Twenty-nine members of JI have joined the program (Jones 2008) and a few members of other jihadist organizations. This is only a small fraction of the 300 male and one female terrorist suspects who have been brought to trial in Indonesia since the first Bali bombing in 2002 and the 400 arrested (Jones 2008). Some of the anti-terrorism police who coordinate this program treat the terrorists as family, give them unconditional respect, pray with them in prison, find out what their problems are and try to help them out with the problems. In Australia it is controversial that an Afghan veteran as centrally involved in the Bali I bombing as Ali Imron⁷, and who was also involved in the 2000 bombing of the Philippine Ambassador's residence and the Christmas eve bombings of 38 churches, could be freely walking the streets to participate in the program just a couple of years into a life sentence. Ali Imron does not argue that violent jihad is wrong in the cause of establishing an Islamic state, but he now sees it as wrong to kill innocent civilians. And he sees terror as something that will never attract the support of most Indonesian Muslims (ICG 2007a: 12-13).

Politics and the Security Forces

National and international political actors play important roles in the ending of this conflict, as do security forces that move in from other parts of Indonesia. But there are not the credible stories of provocateurs coming in from Java to start the conflict that there were in Ambon, for example. On the other hand, JI activists from Java were the key agitators who kept the conflict going through most of the current decade. Nor are there credible stories of the military intentionally provoking conflicts that we discussed in *Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 1* on West Papua. In the four cases so far, as we have moved from Papua to Maluku to North Maluku to Central

⁷ He trained the bombers, installed the detonators in their bombs and drove them to the Sari Club.

Sulawesi, we have moved from cases where the sources of the conflict were more national to cases where its political sources have been progressively more local. In Central Sulawesi, the leading local instigators and escalators were not even provincial politicians (as in North Maluku), but political competitors for corrupt patrimonial power at the level of Poso district government. There was some competition at the subdistrict level as well (as there also was in North Maluku). The next cases (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 4*), West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan, were also (especially West Kalimantan) more about ambitions for control of district than provincial government, and not about ambitions for national political office.

Human Rights Watch (2002: 8) reported survey research, led by Dr Suriadi Mappangara in Poso, that found 67 per cent of respondents to attribute the conflict to politics, especially competition for office, with only 6 per cent describing religion as the cause. Respondents mostly felt it was about politics, with religion then dragged into the conflict to build support. Human Rights Watch (2002: 8) also reported NGO research associating spikes in violence with elections in various districts and also in the municipality of Palu.

In Central Sulawesi there was much criticism, and seemingly justified criticism, from both sides of the security forces for bias against their side, torture, summary execution, reckless firing of live rounds and selling ammunition. Retired military officers seemed to have been involved in training militias on both sides. Yet it is clear that in none of these respects was the misbehaviour of the security forces in Central Sulawesi anywhere near as bad as in Papua (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 1*) or Maluku (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 2*). Nor were the security forces initiators of attacks in the way they often were in these other two cases, though a few police and military personnel may have joined mobs and contributed to the violence (McRae 2007: 89). While there were problems of poor coordination between the police and the military sent in to support the police when they lost control, there were not reports of firefights between the police and the military as occurred in Maluku, Aceh, Papua, Central Kalimantan and elsewhere in transitional Indonesia.

The main criticism that should be made of the security forces is that they were indecisive in the early stages of the conflict, though much of the blame for this lies with their political masters, who, for example, pushed Brimob in then pulled them out in response to complaints from Muslim fighters, who promptly resumed their rampage. There is an element in common between the police and military response in Poso and North Maluku. This element was a tendency to vacillate, leaving civilians unprotected, as commanders sniffed the air to try to work out which way the political winds were blowing. At the command level, the security forces were too risk-averse in their sensitivity to political backlash. On the ground, ordinary troops were often undisciplined, using the very excessive force their commanders feared could get them into hot water if it were directed against politically powerful locals or well connected Javanese jihadists.

Worst of all, the security forces welcomed Laskar Jihad and other outside mujahadin instead of preventing their deployment and confiscating their weapons. The irony was that outside mujahadin were warmly welcomed by ordinary Muslims and the political

elite of the province because they believed mujahadin would provide protection to Muslim villages that the security forces failed to provide during the third phase of the conflict. More locally, as Human Rights Watch (2002: 41) pointed out, simple roadblocks were needed right at the beginning of the conflict to prevent the deployment of truckloads of fighters all headed to Poso from Tentena, Palu, Parigi and Ampana. Ironically, Muslim women and children managed to use roadblocks to stand in the way of the security forces themselves in November 2001 when they sought to capture Muslim fighters.

At the same time, there were many reports of the security forces being effective when used. These include cases where fighting that had raged for hours ceased as soon as the security forces arrived (Human Rights Watch 2002: 42). Without the more effective deployments of 2001, the Malino socialization process would never have persuaded villagers, as it generally did, that they were no longer caught in a security dilemma (attack or be attacked) (McRae 2008: 169, 194). So the verdict is clear that security sector indecisiveness allowed the conflict to escalate; security sector strength helped deescalation.

Law enforcement that was biased against Christians in the early phases of the conflict was also important to its escalation. On the positive side of the ledger, the effective investigation and firm enforcement of the police against hold-outs in 2006 and 2007 seems to have finally in January 2007 brought religious violence to a decisive end.

At the time of our fieldwork in 2007, Poso was still the most heavily policed district in Indonesia with 2697 police, plus 900 Brimob (riot police). The peak report in the documentary record is of a mobilisation of 7000 Brimob to Poso hot-spots in 2004 (Sangadji 2004a), quite an extraordinary level of policing, if accurate, for such a small district. Five police were living in each village in 2007 to smother ignition points of potential new conflicts. They worked with a group of 15 citizens in each village responsible for community protection. Their job included preventing conflict before it arose and working with journalists to avoid provocative coverage when minor incidents of violence did flare.

A more mundane law enforcement failure in many subdistricts, especially given this high level of police resources, was a failure to ensure that rice fields and other land and property acquired and used by others after IDPs were driven out was returned to these IDPs. Sometimes this enforcement failure was timidity about unsettling a fragile peace. However, short-term conflict to ensure that justice is done sometimes is necessary to secure long-term peace. In other cases, the police can reasonably say that title to the land is a civil matter where those occupying the land post-conflict claim the land was stolen from them in the years before the conflict. For poor people who lack the capacity to litigate such matters in the courts, proactive community policing that mobilises customary legal institutions to get such disputes settled fairly is imperative for eliminating this risk factor for future violence.

Reconciliation

The trajectory of involvement of the majority of religious leaders is rather similar between Central Sulawesi, North Maluku and Maluku. As one religious leader explained to Human Rights Watch (2002: 19): ‘At first religious institutions tried to

reduce the conflict. But then it shifted to religion, and religious institutions joined in'. We can actually define three stages; first, before the conflict came to be interpreted as one of survival of each religious community, religious leadership was mainly a force for reconciliation. In the second stage, the religious leadership saw the survival of their community at stake; during this phase they ceased being a force for reconciliation and sacralized violence. In the third phase, as prospects of peace re-emerged, religious leaderships on both sides became forces for reconciliation again. This happened not only, not mainly, through formal inter-faith dialogues, though a Communication Forum for Interreligious Followers (FKUB), established in Poso in April 2002. As in the Maluku and North Maluku cases, peacebuilding by inter-religious participation in routine religious rituals that have a purpose other than peacebuilding, such as funerals, was important. Christian invitations to Muslims to join in Christmas celebrations and Muslim invitations to join in Mohammed's Birthday and halal bi halal are significant sites of reconciliation. John Braithwaite personally experienced the feeling of shared humanity in one such invitation to a Muslim leader's home for Mohammed's birthday. As we found in Maluku and North Maluku (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 2*) non-truth and reconciliation is favoured over apology and forgiveness for specific crimes because 'People...generally do not want to talk about the tragic incidents they experienced in the past. They expressed that they would rather talk about what actions need to be taken next for a better future than talking about what happened in the past.' (Augustiana 2004: 8). This may be why Shearing and Johnston (2005) could be right, reflecting on their experience in South Africa, that the conception of justice most oppressed people recovering from conflict are interested in is 'justice as a new future'.

Social cohesion and organic reconciliation at the local level have proved resilient in Central Sulawesi. We were surprised at the depth of religious tolerance that had a remorseful character even among interviewees who had reputations as leaders of conflict. As in Maluku, North Maluku and Kalimantan there were many cases of members of one religious community protecting the persons or property of friends from the other community at the height of the conflict. Post-conflict, ripples of reconciliation spread from these special relationships of courage and care. Following the failure of top-down reconciliation by President Wahid and the provincial governors in August 2000, community dialogue between Muslims and Christians has been energised by religious and adat leaders, by NGOs, including some international NGOs such as Mercy Corps and by a magazine. Combatant leaders agreeing to be part of this through Malino was critical to creating the environment where bottom-up reconciliation could flourish, however. Joint Muslim-Christian village watches became an important vehicle for both reconciliation and prevention of new provocations. Many people said they did not like meetings mediated by the government, preferring mediation by religious, adat and village leaders.

One married woman and man still living in an IDP camp in Tentena when we visited in 2007 were reconciliation leaders. They said most IDPs were by then averse to *any* third party mediation of return to homes where IDPs still felt unsafe. Between 2002 and 2004, they said, reconciliations between IDPs and their home communities were government- or NGO-mediated. From 2005 they had been self-initiated with respect to their IDP camp: 'This is better. [The self-initiated ones get] no financial support. We pay the costs out of our own pockets but we still prefer it. Yes the adat

community attends often and contributes.’ The biggest IDP-initiated reconciliation they had helped organize involved an attendance of 300 – 100 Christian IDPs bussed from Tentena to Poso town joined by 200 Muslims in Poso. We asked if they rely on adat rituals and philosophy for reconciliations or whether they would have Muslim followed by Christian prayers or hymns. No, they said, they keep religious rites out of their self-initiated reconciliations. They lean on rites of adat. Adat symbolizes that all people of Poso are brothers. Women are involved, they say, and all generations too.

Old adat leaders, some very old, give their blessing for the reconciliation, but a new generation of young adat leaders do most of the work, the preparation and follow-through. Inter-generational respect for adat remains high across Poso geographically (less so in Poso town) and across religions. A comparative survey of satisfaction with ‘informal justice systems’ in former conflict zones in West Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi found Poso district was equal highest in satisfaction with Ketapang, West Kalimantan (UNDP 2007: 70). In Poso, they dance the dero at their self-initiated reconciliations. This involves dancing hand in hand in a circle. Doing the dance was a breakthrough in itself because at the height of the conflict many ulamas banned it. They were concerned that dero dancing had become associated with ‘drinking alcohol, hand holding and boy meets girl’ activities among the young. Actually adat leaders on the Christian side were concerned about this too. So dero was returned to tradition, alcohol was banned, and the holding of hands was about reconciliation, not about boys meeting girls.

Dialogue on root causes was an important part of their reconciliations, as was true of NGO-mediated reconciliations. Provocations such as bomb explosions had still been common in the months before our fieldwork. Both sides of the reconciliation network met to talk about the new provocation when it occurred. Women to women informal networks forged through the reconciliation process were particularly important in this. The energy and engagement of this reconciliation initiated by both IDPs and receiving communities in Poso made a stark contrast with the more limited, tentative and fearful reintegration of Madurese in Kalimantan where we had been doing fieldwork during the same period.

Leadership in self-initiated IDP reintegration seemed to be connected in Poso to leadership in building new legitimate opportunities, the blockage of which had been a source of the conflict. The abstract theory that conflict arises when legitimate means to valued goals like political participation are blocked, and illegitimate means such as violence are open, seems to fit these data. Yet it only connects to transformative peace when there is a path for leadership, entrepreneurship, to grasp new legitimate opportunities and to close off illegitimate opportunities like ethnic cleansing to steal land and crops of the other at the point of a gun. Leadership for legitimate entrepreneurship and against illegitimate opportunism can begin, as in Poso, by resisting state-dependency and NGO-dependency for reconciliation. It can be reinforced, as in Poso, by a Musrenbang process, and UNDP support for it, that connects top-down planning to bottom-up leadership of conflict-sensitive development.⁸ This process of village planning in one month followed by subdistrict

⁸ In Poso, we heard very different opinions on whether the Musrenbang was beginning to work to empower village-level leadership, some hopeful, some pessimistic. We attended the ultimate province-level planning meeting of 400 people.

planning in the next month, then district level, then provincial planning in the final month can be assisted by donor initiatives that help catalyse leadership rather than take over. A good example is Care International's 'Vision Mapping' in Central Sulawesi assisting villages to draw maps of their village now and in five years. This helps them to envision what might happen to patterns of settlement and trade if they made it a planning priority in their village to build a bridge at a particular site. Care International's work in Central Sulawesi discussing options with groups of farmers for showing leadership to link up marketing opportunities to sell cash crops is another example.

One reconciliation dialogue in 2004 was attended by 2000 young Muslims and Christians (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005: xiv). When local meetings between Christians and Muslims who had been at each others' throats occurred for the first time in the back half of 2002, the two groups of religious leaders would sit together at the front facing the meeting. Both groups would call for peace, as would heads of villages, subdistricts and the district. They would call for dialogue and reconciliation ideas from the meeting. Ideas like a religiously mixed choir, dero dancing together, camping outings for youth, a peace art competition and working together to rebuild houses, schools and health centres were forthcoming. 'The brotherhood of sport' was often advanced as the path of reconciliation. Donors, in contrast, were wary of fights that might break out at football or volleyball contests and whether the brotherhood would be exclusively male. While not all were ready to forgive at these meetings, many who attended say they were conducted in a spirit of forgiveness. There were expressions of regret and apology. But no one ever admitted to specific crimes at these meetings. Backstage there was much hugging and tears between old friends who had not spoken since the conflict. Then friends introduced friends to their friends' enemies.

The Poso Conflict Resolution Group (RKP) and the Institute for the Development of Legal and Human Rights Studies (LPSHAM) were local NGOs who led reconciliation efforts with funding from Mercy Cops. LPSHAM conducted reconciliation dialogues in a Christian village, then a Muslim village, then with a meeting of the two villages, with an average of 30 attending more than 300 meetings they organized. Their meetings did not involve apologies and rituals of forgiveness. Rather they focused on practical issues of IDP return. The hope was that forgiveness might follow in time. Facilitators said humour that might seem morbid or inappropriate to outsiders often worked in dealing with tension. For example, one man laughingly said pointing to a friend with whom he has a minor disagreement in the meeting: 'When we have the conflict again, you are my target.' Another says, smiling: 'Are we attending this meeting as the victims or the actors?' The Research Centre on Peace and Conflict, Tadulako University (P4K/UNTAD) brought combatants from Muslim and Christian

It certainly encouraged the pessimistic view. It was about important people, starting with the Governor and military commander, making speeches about what will and should happen, with limited dialogue. Safari suits and epilettes crowded out isolated civil society actors silently sitting at the margins. Some said this top-down reality permeates down to the village level of the Musrenbang. Others said the lower you go, the more participatory the reality becomes. The risks and opportunities are clear enough. It is far too early to pass any judgement on the limited fieldwork we have been able to undertake.

communities together in dialogue (the largest involved 34 Christian and 34 Muslim fighters). It was agreed in these meetings that religion was used as a pretext for conflict that was not actually about religion. Local women's NGOs have also done important reconciliation work, particularly in getting communities to give assurances to women IDPs that they will be safe if they return to their homes. The Group for the Struggle for Women's Equality convened a Women's Friendship Meeting of 420 Muslim and Christian women in July 2004.

The Malino talks did not deliver a high quality or broad base of reconciliation dialogue. The great strength of Malino that local peacebuilding could not deliver was that three levels of government were brought to the table – central, provincial and district. It did establish a Socialization and Reconciliation Team made up of members of each side for each affected subdistrict. In many subdistricts these teams were catalysts for education of the community in the terms of the agreement and of much inspiring local reconciliation work.

An interesting feature of the Malino agreement was that it gave a role to the military in rebuilding housing which was funded by the provincial government. In the aftermath of many tense confrontations and shooting at both sides by the military, this provided an opportunity for reconciliation with the military through *gotong royong* (mutual aid, or 'joint bearing of burdens' as Clifford Geertz (1983: 167-234) put it). Many in the military had expertise in house building, equipment and commitment to the task. They enjoyed helping the long-suffering people and it gave them a constructive role in the peace. Payment from the provincial government for the work, some allege in lieu of normal deployment funding, also gave the military a financial stake in the peace.

The philosophy of *maroso* (or *sintuwu maroso* – strength through togetherness) was seen as predating local religious differences. It means helping each other, including across the religious divide. *Maroso* was also said to mean a philosophy of 'tightening brotherhood'. This unity aspect is what is drawing more Muslims to *maroso* post-conflict. Pre-conflict *maroso* had more support in the Christian community, leading some Muslims to see it (wrongly) as a Christian rather than pre-Christian tradition. We drove through several villages where almost every home had a painted wooden frame at their front entrance announcing the commitment of the whole village to *maroso*.

There was never a debate about having a truth and reconciliation commission for Central Sulawesi. There has been a debate about a general amnesty for crimes committed before Malino, but this has not transpired, at least in any formal way.

Interpreting the Conflict

What Structural Factors Were at the Root of this Conflict?

As in other Indonesian cases, Dutch colonialism played some role in disrupting and destroying cultural bridges between Muslim and Christian communities in Central Sulawesi. The Dutch saw potential in the missionized highlanders early in the twentieth century as a 'protestant buffer against the potential political threat of Islam based at the coasts' (Aragon 2001: 52). They introduced regulations and trade

measures that disrupted precolonial highland-lowland alliances based on trade, mutual military defence and 'royal' or elite marriages. Mission schools educated Protestant highlanders but rarely Muslims on the coast. These educated Protestants, as in Ambon, were favoured for positions in the local bureaucracy, which did not endear them to Muslim majorities. Protestant areas got health clinics; Muslim areas did not. The education policy of the Republic of Indonesia gradually equalised access to schooling. But Christian dominance of the local civil service was tenacious, continuing discrimination in favour of Christian recruitment. Christian highlanders lost their educational advantage while never fully recovering from being cut off from the coastal trade networks that fuelled business entrepreneurship, cash cropping and logging (especially of high-value ebony) that created wealth. It was Muslim immigrants and the Chinese that networked into the opportunities for entrepreneurship.

Brown, Tajima and Hadi (2005: xi) have a nice way of summarizing this structural factor in the conflict, which they call horizontal inequalities: 'The combination of severe historical inequalities between Christian and Muslim with the Islamization policies of the last decade of the New Order, created socio-economic discontent'.⁹ As in many parts of Indonesia, these inequalities were intensified by transmigration and spontaneous immigration, particularly of Bugis from South Sulawesi, giving a particular intensity in Central Sulawesi to competition between Muslim Bugis immigrants and indigenous Christians.

Of all the conflict areas in Indonesia only Maluku had a bigger economic downturn between 1997 and 2001. The Poso economy declined by 2.1 per cent for these four years. The worst year was 2000, where there was a 4.3 per cent decline in GDP (Wilson 2005: 68-69). So the decline is more an effect of the conflict than of the Asian financial crisis.

The proportion of workers who were in non-agricultural jobs was 45 per cent in 1998 compared to 55 per cent for Indonesia overall (van Klinken 2007: 39). So there is not a huge argument that the comparative shortage of legitimate opportunities through industrial economy jobs was a structural incentive to use violence to control the other source of non-agricultural economic opportunity in the public sector. On the other hand, the ratio of civil servants to non-agricultural workers was almost three times the ratio for Indonesia overall (van Klinken 2007: 41). So in this sense there was a stronger structural incentive in Central Sulawesi compared to almost all other provinces to grab control of public sector patrimony as a path to economic success.

What Have Been the Proximate Factors in Conflict?

The Asian economic crisis increased poverty in Central Sulawesi by 251 per cent between 1996 and 1999, twice the national average. Before then, it was already one of

⁹ Or as Aragon (2000: 318) put it: 'Although this book's research indicates that these [Muslim-Christian] tensions began with European policies for colonial control and missionization of ethnic minorities, they took on a new dimension when the New Order government promoted competition for modernization among religions and more thoroughly regulated the ways in which followers of Islam and Christianity could relate to one another'.

the poorer provinces in Indonesia (Brown, Tajima and Hadi (2005: xi, 9). Transition, according to Brown and Diprose (2007: 4), might not be seen as a root cause of violence during democratisation, but transition does create a space where pre-existing grievances can surface. Transition also was a space in which the security forces were indecisive because they did not know which way the wind was blowing. They were accustomed to an environment where they knew exactly who was in charge. Initial tentativeness saw a failure of the police to extinguish minor flare-ups that ignited wider rioting, looting and violence. When the first law enforcement did come, the security forces basically took the side of the Muslim majority, arresting only Christians when it was Christians who had overwhelmingly been victims of this first phase of the violence. Ultimately both sides came to be resentful of what they saw as the religious bias of the justice system and came to view vigilantism as the only path to justice.

Decentralization created specific new political opportunities in Central Sulawesi during the transition to democracy. In the process of transition, settled power-sharing and turn-taking conventions became unsettled. Political opportunists supported by business opportunists went after chances to totally monopolise patronage controlled by new district government. In this winner-take-all, no-holds-barred grab for decentralised political power and business corruption, the organizations most available to be harnessed by those with political ambitions happened to be religious because political parties were comparatively organizationally weak, as were other organizations in civil society. Because of that organizational enrolment imperative, ruthless political competition for a new pot of gold in an era when gold had become more scarce became religious competition.

Once violence erupted for political or religious reasons, Human Rights Watch (2002: 9) concluded economic interests in looting shops and villages, taking the land and cash crops of the displaced and selling weapons contributed to escalation. Looting was not always casual and episodic; at times, well organized convoys of trucks to transport booty followed militias into attacks.

By the latter phases of the conflict, revenge became the main motive for violence. In addition, Poso came to the conflict with more of a history of post-independence Muslim-Christian conflict than perhaps anywhere in Indonesia as a result of being caught between an armed Christian separatist movement progressing down from North Sulawesi and Darul Islam moving up from the South Sulawesi. At each stage, the Poso case makes more visible than in other cases the desire to settle the score for violence in earlier conflicts becoming a proximate cause of a subsequent attack. So we can conceive of the cycle of revenge as a particularly major proximate factor in Poso.

Inflammatory media reports were an important factor in escalating the conflict, in bringing outside mujahidin in on the side of Muslims and US diplomacy on the side of Christians (Aragon 2001). For example, the Central Sulawesi Mercusuar helped provoke the fourth phase of the conflict following an incident in which just one man was killed with the headline 'Phase IV of the Poso Conflict Breaks Out' (Human Rights Watch 2002: 21). During the conflict, Christian and Muslim journalists established their own newspapers, which are now closed. Over time the local media

have become more sensitive to their role in averting conflict escalation. LPSHAM put out a Bulletin with a peace journalism emphasis on stories that touch peoples' hearts. For example, items explained why a group of Christians missed their home village and why their neighbours missed them. In 2004, a number of Central Sulawesi journalists attended peace journalism workshops conducted by the BBC. Journalists are now more wary of publishing false or inflammatory rumours and check with accused persons to get their reaction to the accusation.

The arrival in Poso of a succession of jihadist militias was each an important proximate factor in escalating the conflict. JI's substantial presence in Poso was particularly important in extending the terrorist phase of the violence for much longer than anywhere else in Indonesia.

Vacillating police and military intervention to protect civilians and to establish roadblocks to prevent militias from mounting attacks was a proximate factor in allowing violence to spin out of control. There was also mismanagement of attempts to persuade the community that arrests and trials would be conducted without religious bias. Levels of dissatisfaction with the 'formal justice system' is higher in Central Sulawesi (47 per cent) than in Maluku (21 per cent), North Maluku (31 per cent) and West Kalimantan (32 per cent) (UNDP 2007: 70). This was also connected to political timidity in the justice sector. The police often arrested individuals, raising expectations from victims, and then backed away from law enforcement when arrests led to large protests or complaints from political elites.

What were the Key Triggering Incidents?

The triggers for both the first two waves of violence dominated by Muslims were fights between Christian and Muslim youth in which the Muslim youth claimed to show a knife wound he had suffered. The third phase dominated by Christians was a series of premeditated attacks to wreak vengeance that involved no trigger. In the fourth phase where Muslims dominated after the arrival of jihadists from outside the province, a typical clash 'began with a conflict between neighbouring villages, such as over cacao harvests. Rumours of an attack circulated, and fighters from one or both sides gathered before launching a "pre-emptive" attack' (Human Rights Watch 2002: 20). When a war has ripened to the point where a security dilemma has become a proximate reason for preemptive attacks, there is usually no triggering incident.

Who were the Key Warmaking and Peacebuilding Actors?

McRae (2008: 1) sees the violence as a collective enterprise in which 'no one was in complete control'. The worst violence and property destruction was perpetrated by crowds with home-made weapons. On the Muslim side crowds were often led by semi-trained outside fighters with automatic weapons who had experience in Maluku or Afghanistan. Politicians aspiring to winner-take-all political control of the district government of Poso and business backers who looked forward to getting contracts and sharing in the looting of the district coffers through embezzlement may have been the actors who did most to destroy peace. The military was not a key warmaking actor in the way it was in Maluku and Papua; it was also a more important humanitarian

actor in Poso than in any of our other Indonesian cases, in building houses for IDPs. A variety of different militias with varying degrees of training and organization were the crucial warmaking actors. On the Christian side, all were locally-based. The Christian militias were organized ad hoc and temporarily. On the Muslim side, JI was organized from Java and had the most elaborated national and international networking. JI was also the warmaking actor with the staying power to carry the conflict forward right up into 2007. Laskar Jihad was another important warmaker with national organization and large membership. But it disbanded in October 2002 and up to then was never the dominant player in the conflict that it had become in Maluku.

Post-conflict, locals said Poso did not have a large problem of preman (semi-organized criminals) or semi-criminalized youth groups. The police leaders we spoke with were also of the view that preman leadership was not central on either the Christian or Muslim side during the conflict. Nor was it an important part of the post-conflict crime problem in Poso. Certainly old militarised youth movements from the conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s were reactivated at the height of the violence. But this collective organization was disbanded and did not persist. Several informants said there was a significant youth crime problem, associated with alcohol for example, but this was not mobilised through criminal gangs. Perhaps this was because the main competing structure to traditionally moderate adat and religious leadership was some 200 radical JI religious teachers. Central to their project was steering young people away from the influences of preman and alcohol.

We have seen that religious leaders shifted in the trajectory of the conflict from first being peacemakers, then warmakers, then peacemakers again in the final phases of the conflict. Journalists were key fomenters of conflict in the early phases; they practiced peace journalism more often in the latter stages.

The most important peacebuilding actors were IDPs who became leaders in IDP camps and adat and religious leaders in local communities that initiated reconciliation and gotong royong to welcome and reintegrate IDPs. As in the Moluccas, leaders in reconciliatory rituals of everyday life such as funerals were important peacebuilders. There were many important peacebuilding NGO leaders as well. Yayasan Tanah Merdeka (YTM) was one. Ministers Kalla and Yudoyono played important national leadership roles in making the Malino peace process happen.

Care International, World Vision, Mercy Corps and Church World Service from the US were international NGOs who helped with emergency response for IDPs initially and then with rehabilitation and reconstruction. The European Union and USAID were large donors. The major international humanitarian players agreed on a Common Humanitarian Action Plan. This coordination assisted with the comparatively rapid return of IDPs to rebuild their homes. The government assisted IDP families with Rp 4 million in materials for rebuilding houses and Rp 1 million in cash. Families that had lost members received another Rp 2 million for each (Simanjuntak 2001).

There was greater concern from the international community about what was happening in Poso than there was in other parts of Indonesia between 2001 and

2004.¹⁰ This, however, did not translate into international diplomatic actors doing anything especially constructive to build peace. The International Crisis Group did an outstanding job of diagnosing Poso's problems and Human Rights Watch a fine job in exposing human rights abuses. In spite of this, one would not say human rights groups have been key peacebuilding actors in the way they have been in Papua, for example (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 1*).

Motivational Postures of Key Actors

Valerie Braithwaite (2009) defines motivational postures as sets of beliefs and attitudes that sum up how actors feel about and wish to position themselves in relation to a source of authority. Actors send signals to an authority (be it a government agency, a religious authority or a militia) about how it is regarded and how much social distance is placed between them and the authority. Beliefs and attitudes comprising each motivational posture are based on an appraisal of what the authority stands for, what it is demanding, and how it engages with the needs and aspirations of those it seeks to govern. Valerie Braithwaite's factor analytic studies of beliefs and attitudes of businesses responding to regulators and ordinary and sophisticated taxpayers toward tax authorities, empirically found five motivational postures as recurrently fundamental to the human condition:

Commitment means willingly embracing of the mission of the authority.

Capitulation means surrender to the will of an authority, to the letter of its law without fully embracing its spirit.

Resistance means vocal opposition to the power the authority has and how it uses it. Resistance is about grievance.

Disengagement means psychological dissociation that renders an actor immune to attempts by an authority to steer their actions.

Game playing is a more imaginative and bold practice for escaping constraint by redefining rules, moving goalposts or repositioning self. It implies keen engagement with the rules of the game, analysing regulatory and governance systems with disarming acuity and clarity of purpose. Authorities are not resented; they are playing the game too, just on a different team. More often than not, gaming is about greed.

It is often difficult to say whether armed conflict is more about greed (and *game playing*) than grievance (and *resistance*). The aspiring winner-take-all politicians and their business sponsors were obviously in the business of greed and gaming both *reformasi* and religious identity. Looters were about greed of a simpler kind; this was an important motivation in the initial rioting (McRae 2008: 47). Moreover, 'the liquor round-up of the first period may have been a good opportunity for youths to drink for free' (McRae 2008: 67). Some opportunists used the conflict to seize land long coveted from a wealthier neighbour. The security forces made money out of the conflict by extorting payments from trucks and buses, renting weapons to combatants and other illegal business activities (McRae 2008: 178). As important as greed was at

¹⁰ Dave McRae, in his comments on this paper, doubts this, concluding 'Poso was mostly off the radar'.

the foundation of this conflict, in none of the *Peacebuilding Compared* cases so far was there quite as clear a picture of grievance being more important than greed in the latter stages. By 2001, most informants say that most attacks were motivated by revenge for earlier attacks. Most of the JI and Mujahidin Kompak hardline holdouts who kept the conflict going between 2002 and 2007 remained poor. It seems plausible that the lure of jihad was heavenly rather than earthly riches. Yet the impecunious condition of jihadists made them vulnerable to state carrots of ex-combatant reintegration. Those who walk into war out of grievance can walk out via 'greed'. We saw this with some Free Papua Movement former guerrillas who came in from the jungle (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper I*).

The motivational posture of *commitment* to religious leaders who at different phases of this history led their flocks to war or to peace was evident. While there seemed to be a great deal of *commitment* to the hold-out JI ulamas, as manifest in many faithful rallying to defend them in the final assault of January 2007, quite a bit of that apparent *commitment* turned out to be *capitulation*. In hindsight we know this was particularly evident during January 2007 when many local followers of JI religious teachers wanted to surrender to the police, but JI leaders from Java denounced this as weakness. Then when JI was pacified in Poso, local followers *capitulated* to the state in large numbers. Valerie Braithwaite's (2009) foundational data on motivational postures shows that people hold different motivational postures simultaneously, with degrees of tenacity that vary across time and context. It is the balance of salience of different motivational postures that matters. At critical life moments such as arrest for a crime, multiple, even all, motivational postures can increase simultaneously. So a final assault on JI religious leaders can simultaneously induce heightened feelings of commitment to them by their followers and increased attraction to capitulation to the state. Indeed this seems to be what happened. We see the same possibility with the dozens of jihadists who have cooperated with the carrots and religious counter-arguments of the anti-terrorism police and the religious scholars and reformed terrorists working with them. These converts of counter-terrorism mostly do not renounce their *commitment* to the ideal of an Islamic state with Sharia law; while clinging to it, they *capitulate* to an antithetically secular state. The nub of that *capitulation* is a cognitive shift about what sort of jihad is most effective in the long run for the triumph of Islam. The cleverness of this Indonesian counter-terrorism work is that its subjects do not perceive themselves as *capitulating* to the Republic as much as they see themselves as *capitulating* to a more sophisticated and nuanced religious authority. They *capitulate* to religious leaders who persuade them that murdering civilians who perhaps have never been given an opportunity to study Islam increases opposition to Islam and is not God's way.

Commitment to the Indonesian state is rather less in Poso than one experiences in many other parts of Indonesia. We see this in the fact that most of the more important leaders of preventive diplomacy and reconciliation in Poso have been non-state actors. We see it in the ferocious *resistance* of some Tentena IDP camp members to reconciliations run by the state or even funded by states through NGOs. Yet *resistance* to the state by IDPs and others in Poso with low levels of *commitment* to the Republic is less prevalent than *disengagement* from the state.

Disengagement was also a problem on the part of vacillating security forces in the early phases of the conflict. In the latter stages, however, the security forces mostly

did their job, manifesting strong *commitment* to the Republic and its constitution. Extraordinary levels of *commitment* are also manifest in much of the work of the anti-terrorism police. Not many Western police would be willing to spend a night in prison with terrorists to maintain the momentum of goodwill they are building with them. In Poso we do not see the heights of *resistance* to President Wahid's state and *game playing* with the state that were so striking in Maluku and Papua. *Resistance* and *gaming* the state were certainly evident at times, but so much less frequently so than in Papua and Maluku that one would never say the *resistance* and *game playing* by security forces were among the fundamental drivers of the Poso conflict. Precisely that was argued about the Papua and Maluku conflicts in Working Papers I and 2 of *Peacebuilding Compared*.

Fabianus Tibo's testimony in his defence against the prosecutor's case was that there were 16 protestant business and political leaders who were the real leaders of Christian violence. This defence was in essence that he and his co-defendants were convenient scapegoats as minority Catholic transmigrants for the crimes of local protestant leaders who were *game players* with the state and also *gamers* of religious organizational authority. Many Christians and some researchers such as George Aditjondro and journalists such as from the *Jakarta Post* believe Tibo was not involved in the killings at the boarding school. The evidence produced against them included 'no witnesses [who] actually saw the men commit murder' (McRae 2007: 99). Even the Pope reportedly got involved by writing a letter urging clemency (ICG 2007c: 11). Many Christians and Muslims in Poso believe the Protestant leaders who ordered the slaughter at the boarding school bribed justice officials to secure the release of the indigenous Protestant killers, so that 'outside provocateurs' in the form of the executed Catholic migrants could be blamed. Without accepting Tibo's innocence, we can concede his point that the actors who activated war were Poso (and Palu) politicians and businessmen who sought to play a winner-take-all *game* of control over district government, plus some retired military officers. The same elites also *gamed* religious authorities, Islamic and Christian, by capturing the religious organizations they controlled to their projects of power. In particular, Tibo and his defenders said the synod of the Central Sulawesi Christian Church, which represents a thousand churches in the province, directly or indirectly backed the Red Christian army that did most of the slaughter of May-June 2000.¹¹ At the same time, we can

¹¹ As Universitas Indonesia Professor Franz Magnus-Suseno put it before the executions: 'Of course if I may say this, their deaths would be really very useful for many people and this is the tragedy of the thing. If these three people are executed then the Muslims of Poso feel vindicated in a certain sense and they will more easily keep to the peace agreement. The Protestants in Tentena also would accept this. Now if they are not executed, then the Muslims will demand that the real perpetrators of the massacre be brought to court and given the death penalty and they would be people from the Protestant community in Tentena. Now, if this happens, people in Tentena will say what happens to those that killed our Christians before this massacre in Poso. They also have to be brought to justice. You see the whole thing will unravel. So the same is true in a certain sense on the national basis. I think that many people, including many Muslims, are afraid that if Tibo and the other two are not executed the Government will have difficulties in executing the Muslim terrorists of Bali and so on and they all want them executed, so they hope that Tibo is executed. You see how the odds are against those three.' ABC Radio National Encounter interview 9 July, 2006.

accept McRae's (2008) conclusion that Tibo and his co-defendant Dominggus were on the balance of probabilities 'more than rank-and-file combatants', while 'we know much less about [the third executed defendant] Marinus.'¹²

We have found that *maroso* mattered in Poso reconciliation because there was a high level of *commitment* to adat leaders even in Poso town, but especially in most rural villages of the district. Many adat leaders in Poso are very old. At the height of the conflict, they lost authority to younger men who found a non-adat path to village authority by becoming militia leaders. But as in Maluku and North Maluku, an adat (*maroso*) that had been waning pre-conflict and during the height of the conflict has been reinvigorated and reinvented as a more syncretically Muslim-Christian 'brotherhood' (and sisterhood actually). Peacebuilding has also opened new paths to upward mobility in local status systems for young men who are the youthful energisers of adat's rebirth, but under the authority of elders.

Adat and religious leaders believe that alcohol played a major role in youthful *disengagement* from and *resistance* to their authority at the moments when violence spun out of control.

Peacebuilding Strengths and Weaknesses

In an interview with a former police commander and current community leader in Central Sulawesi, he gave an interesting answer to what were the four turning points:

1. Malino
2. 'Laskar Jihad' (and other outside mujahidin) decide to leave
3. The improved integration of top-down with bottom-up planning from 2006 which gave villages, then sub-districts, then districts, then the province a chance to plan budget priorities in a conflict-sensitive way.
4. The final clean-out of the 'terrorists' in January 2007.

The surprising part of this answer was the third. It is the turning point most would find it hard to put a finger on. It also occurs so late in this history that *prima facie* it seems implausible that it could be important. His point was that announcement of the new participatory governance of the region helped create a new climate of trust in government that assisted with capitulation, then commitment to the final, and seemingly permanent Poso peace. In addition, we think his intent was to include the work of the World Bank's Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), which commenced across Indonesia in 1998 and in Central Sulawesi when conflict subsided sufficiently to allow it to start in a subdistrict. The KDP laid a foundation for institutionalizing participatory development, distributing US\$60,000-\$110,000 in block grants to subdistricts (Kecamatan) for villages to spend on almost anything they decide through collective deliberation to be a development priority for their village (Gibson and Woolcock 2005). Some credit is due to the World Bank, the United

McRae (2007: 105) points out that a long judgement in the case made no mention of the testimony of the defence witnesses, though he is not convinced that there was evidence from them that would/should have transformed the judgement.

¹² Passage in quotes is from email comment from Dave McRae on an earlier draft of this paper.

Nations Development Program and international NGOs such as Care International for their support for bottom-up planning in Central Sulawesi. While it seems premature to assess the Musrenbang and other more spontaneous bottom-up initiatives in participatory planning as important peacebuilding strengths in Poso, potentially there is promise of that.

The other three parts of the former police commander's answer are clearer. Malino I got national, provincial and district governments engaged and committed to practical steps for peace. One of these was persuading outside jihadists to return to their homes. As in Maluku, there was a sophisticated multidimensional strategy of carrots, sticks and religious persuasion by both local and imported religious notables. The carrots were more considerable in Poso than in Maluku, involving an interpretation of jihadists as ex-combatants who should get assistance for reintegration into the legitimate economy. The sticks were also more potent, with more jihadist leaders being imprisoned or killed while resisting their arrest in Poso than in Maluku. In a sense, both the multidimensional strategies to dissipate violent jihad in Maluku and Poso ultimately were impressive in their own ways, partly because both were responsive to the contextual imperatives for making the persuasion work. So all four of the police commander's suggested turning points were also plausible candidates as key peacebuilding strengths.

The Malino I accord was not quite as ultimate a turning point toward peace as the Malino II accord in Maluku. Its 10 stipulations were at the vague end of peace agreements. Malino recognised the need for national support for peacebuilding and for a multidimensional approach. The follow-through on the Malino I agreement was even worse than on Malino II in the sense that the nine working groups (pokja) with equal numbers of Muslim and Christian leaders from government, civil society and religious communities that it established 'achieved very little, suffering from a lack of resources' (Brown, Tajima and Hadi, 2005: xiii). In August 2002, after a meeting to review progress in implementation of Malino by most of its signatories, the original working groups were disbanded and replaced by a Communications Forum (Forkum) intended to go down to the subdistrict and village level rather than just the district and provincial level at which the pokja operated.

Poso was the least successful of the post-Suharto peace processes in the proportion of outsiders persuaded to go home and give up their stockpiles of weapons. While it was not as immediately successful as Maluku in this regard, it was ultimately successful, with most returning home by the end of 2002 and nearly all by 2007. So we can generalize that a strength of all the Indonesian peace processes of this era was that they removed the considerable number of outside terrorists from the scene and returned control of peacebuilding to local hands. It is hard to say how successful was the amnesty for the voluntary surrender of weapons between 7 January and 7 February 2002 or the heavy penalties for being caught in possession of weapons after that date. Security forces conducted door-to-door searches for weapons using metal detectors. Weapons surrender started with a trickle of hundreds immediately following Malino and by the end of the 7 March 2002 date agreed for the return of all outsiders, the police said 39,000 'weapons' (actually many of the 'weapons' were ammunition or arrows) had been handed in, nearly all homemade. Some said the number of weapons reported as surrendered by both sides was suspiciously even (Human Rights Watch 2002: 31). We do know that hardliners kept impressive

stockpiles of automatic weapons and bombs after that date. Even by January 2003, information obtained from the police by McRae (2008: 196) indicate that of 1757 guns recovered, only 6 were factory-standard firearms.

Many thought the quality of peace dialogue in Malino was poor. While it was good to get Jakarta more engaged and taking responsibility for the conflict, there was a quality of Jakarta just telling everyone what they had to do now. While it was good that the provincial leadership was there taking responsibility rather than saying this was something the district of Poso would have to sort, many thought there were too many delegates from Palu and not enough from Poso. On the other hand, many of the powerbrokers behind the scenes provoking and funding the conflict were from Palu. And while Poso was the site of well over 90 per cent of the killing, there were many terrorist bombings and some important assassinations of leaders in the capital after Malino, retrospectively vindicating the importance of attending to the players in the capital during the peace process. Until Malino, a clear weakness of peacebuilding had been the way the political climate of decentralization was used to excuse Jakarta elites (as in Maluku) saying this was the province's problem and Palu elites saying it was the district's problem.

On every political party slate for the 2005 elections for a bupati and deputy bupati in Poso district, there was both a Muslim and a Christian. Brown and Diprose (2007: 13) found many actors took credit for this including 'grassroots demands', political parties themselves and the electoral commission (KPU). There is also evidence of intellectuals and the media advocating this (Sangadji 2005). There could be some truth in all of these claims to ownership. And perhaps there is something to be said in favour of informal consociationalism like this born of a multidimensional political consensus that emerges both top-down and bottom-up out of peace dialogue. By this we mean that the Muslim-Christian power-sharing of every slate having running mates from both faiths may be better for being informally a product of politics rather than mandated by formal electoral law. One reason it may be better is that it can be transitional. You would certainly think that if you were an outstanding young Hindu political aspirant! So in a future historical conjuncture when wounds across the Muslim-Christian divide are healed, but some different fissure is jeopardizing peace and state legitimacy, then it might be more important to forge political consensus for slates that straddle that new fissure, even if some slates were co-religionists.

As in other cases, there have been allegations of rape and sexual harassment by security personnel at IDP camps (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005: xiii; 37; Wahyuni 2002b). However, levels of self-reported IDP security and return of IDP children to school were high compared to IDPs in other parts of Indonesia (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005: 36) and IDPs got help reasonably quickly to rebuild their homes. The Poso district social welfare agency reported by mid-July 2002 that roughly 40 per cent of the 110,227 displaced people at the time of Malino seven months earlier had been returned (Human Rights Watch 2002: 39).¹³ This had increased to 75 percent by 2003 (Aragon 2008: 178). While local reconciliation efforts were very successful in encouraging IDPs to return compared to the situation we found in Kalimantan, many of those correctly counted as returning to Poso actually returned to new properties

¹³ In total going back to 1998, there may have been over 150,000 IDPs (Wahyuni, 2002a).

within enclaves of their own religious group (Aragon 2008). Some Chinese business families did not return, or as happened frequently in North Maluku, reopened their businesses but chose to live elsewhere (such as Palu, in a case described by Aragon 2008: 195-6). The total number of IDPs was later officially revised upwards to 143,000 (Aragon 2008: 177), almost half the population of the regions affected by the conflict. There was high-level corruption in funds allocated for house-rebuilding for IDPs: a former bupati of Poso was imprisoned for defrauding US\$120,000 from the program along with seven other local officials. A former governor of Central Sulawesi was acquitted in the same case (ICG 2008: 10). Corruption and embezzlement do seem major weaknesses of the peace process, and a special vulnerability in circumstances where some of the programs to reintegrate terrorists are politically sensitive and therefore off-budget and immune for normal accountability checks. The military and police are particularly involved in corruption around illegal logging on indigenous land. Illegal logging possibly was reduced by the conflict, however.

The NGO sector in Poso was weak, much stronger a few hours travel away in the capital Palu, but even there nowhere near as well resourced as in Ambon, Banda Aceh or Jayapura, for example. The main strength in Poso and Palu was with very local NGOs, with the national and international NGO sectors particularly weak. Locals often saw new NGOs mushrooming post-conflict as opportunistically capturing donor funds. Among other things, a comparatively weak NGO sector has hampered accountability of government for embezzlement of IDP funds, corruption and other abuses (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005: 29, 57). As one women's NGO leader from an organization with a large base of grass roots women said of this sector: 'Many women's groups are just flags and no action'. International NGOs have had quite a modest presence in Palu. In Poso for most of the conflict period through to the present, only one or two or none have managed to keep an office open in the insecure environment of Poso; international humanitarian and peacebuilding workers were not to be seen on the streets of the town. We could not find an ICRC presence in Poso or Palu, though we did find a Red Cross Blood Bank in Poso funded by the European Union. The World Bank's Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) invested in participatory community development programs in some of the poorest subdistricts of Poso. Villages develop their own proposals for infrastructure or small business to kickstart development. Elected local leaders coordinate the consultation to select proposals, which include separate consultations with women.

Women's NGOs with international funding have been important in helping overcome the male domination of political life in Poso. Women's roles in peacebuilding, for example in distributing government emergency funds to IDPs, have created new political opportunities for some women. In Augustiana's (2004: 12) assessment, six villages were identified that were headed by women post-conflict. While there was not the extent of female involvement in fighting during the crisis itself as in Aceh or North Maluku, on the Christian side there do seem to have been some female combatants (Augustiana 2004: 19).

One kind of service that was mentioned as in short supply in several interviews, especially for IDP children who had seen terrible things done to their parents, was trauma counselling. A survey by the Health Ministry found 30 per cent of returning IDPs to be suffering one kind of mental disorder or another (Wahyuni 2002a; see also

Wahyuni 2002b). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) contributed US\$100,000 for psychosocial training and health service programs across 12 subdistricts, with the programs being channelled through the International Medical Corps.

It could be said that a strength of peacebuilding in Central Sulawesi has been that a larger proportion of the leaders of violence - more than 100 - have been imprisoned in Poso than in any of our Indonesian cases. Many received heavy sentences by Indonesian standards. This might especially be said given that the Poso conflict, while intense, was mostly confined to one small district of one province and resulted in less loss of life than our other Indonesian cases. On the other hand, many who renounced violence were treated leniently. Fabianus Tibo's and his co-defendants' defence that they were to be executed as scapegoats, that his list of 16 Christian ringleaders bore the responsibility for leading the violence, may not have been without merit, though he had not had direct contact with most of those he named. Yet many women in Poso believe Tibo and his co-defendants were involved in undressing Muslim women and in vaginal 'searches' even if they were not those most deserving of execution for murder. This shocked public opinion about the case and created much of the drama around it, even though none of the defendants were formally charged with sexual assault. One survivor slapped the faces of the three defendants as she walked into the room to testify that one of them had sexually assaulted her.¹⁴ So Poso is not a case of impunity for war crimes, including for crimes against women. This strength is tempered by the weakness of great partiality and inconsistency in the administration of criminal law (McRae 2007). Most of the violence by both Christians and Muslims during the deadliest phases of the conflict was motivated by vengeance for crimes for which it was felt the individual and collective perpetrators had been let off by the state.

From the mid-2000s it might be said that the Central Sulawesi justice system did as fair and firm a job as one might practically expect in the chaotic circumstances of such widespread violence. The number of violence against women cases it dealt with doubled between 2005 and 2006.¹⁵ The police did successfully charge a few on Tibo's

¹⁴ 'Witnesses Testify about Masssacre in Poso', *Jakarta Post*, 6 February 2001. There was also a case during the Poso conflict where a Christian combatant allegedly raped a civilian, for which he was executed by his comrades without trial (McRae 2008: 87).

¹⁵ Feminist NGOs continue nevertheless to be critical of the Poso police for failing to comply with their policies that preclude rape and very serious domestic assault being dealt with by adat – village elders deciding on essentially compensatory remedies such as payment of two buffalo to the victim's family. The overwhelming majority of rape cases are dealt with by compensatory justice through adat, especially if the victim is poor. When rape allegations are made against the military, they have no buffalo to transfer in the traditional way. But interestingly the military do often submit to village adat in preference to having allegations made against them in an urban court. 'They pay Rp.500,000 and it is over'. The women's NGOs are critical of this too: 'For the adat leaders, its money-making because they keep half the penalty [with only half going to the victim or her family]'. Again, while we can see the merit in this feminist critique, it is also important to see that what has happened in Poso is an advance on other Indonesian conflict zones where the military have enjoyed

list of 16. But their investigations found the evidence insufficient on most. One of them Paulus Tungkanan was charged in May 2004 with possession of hundreds of rounds of ammunition, homemade weapons and military uniforms (Sangadji 2004b). But by this stage it was difficult to repair the damage done by the failures to protect people through not enforcing the law in the early years of the conflict. By this stage even-handed rule of law that resulted in more on one side than the other having charges laid or charges dismissed was going to result in angry demonstrations by the side that fared worse, and counter-demonstrations by those demanding justice on behalf of their murdered relatives. One prosecutor had been murdered in Palu in May 2004. When Tibo and his colleagues were executed, Christian rioting occurred not only in Poso but in their home province, where the official residence of a head prosecutor, a courthouse and other public buildings were burned, including a local prison from which all inmates were set free (McRae 2007: 109). The paradox of Poso is that for none of the first 11 cases of *Peacebuilding Compared* did we more frequently hear the complaint that failure to enforce the law in the courts was a root cause of the conflict, yet in no case was the ultimate engagement of criminal law enforcement in bringing the violence to an end firmer or (at least ultimately) more effective. A policeman's lot is not a happy one. One 21 year old policeman happened to be passing when the burial of the JI leader killed by the police raid of 11 January 2007 was taking place. 'He stopped out of respect for the burial and was beaten to death by the mourners' (ICG 2007c: 17).

The many strands of the fabric of reconciliation we have described in Central Sulawesi involved no sharp turning point, but did gradually build pressure for peace. Confidence built cumulatively, allowing more IDPs to return to their homes. The most important work here was done at a very local level involving reconciliation efforts that were not sponsored by the state or by international donors. Both donors and the state seemed to have had the wisdom to see that there was a risk of their efforts to fund reconciliation top-down crowding out spontaneous bottom-up reconciliation.

A strength of Poso reconciliation has been the leadership of women's groups, other NGOs, village leaders, elders of IDP camps and religious leaders. As in the Moluccas, gotong royong was important, as by Christian victors initiating the rebuilding of mosques of Muslims they vanquished, and likewise with Muslim victors persuading IDPs to return to work together in rebuilding churches. John Braithwaite's fieldwork notes from one interview with a womens' NGO suggests that women can show peacebuilding leadership in this:

The women in the Christian part of the village organize their young people on a certain day to work at repairing the mosque. 'It doesn't work if the men try to show this kind of leadership'. But the men join in once it gets underway. Maybe they need an electrician to fix the sound system in the mosque and the local electrician yields to the plea from the women to help the young people with this part of the job. The day ends with visits of the expelled minority to their old

impunity for sexual assault and rape. In July 2004, four police were prosecuted for alleged immorality in the form of extramarital relationships with Poso girls who became pregnant with the officers refusing to accept responsibility ('Police on Trial for Immorality', Jakarta Post, 14 July 2004).

village. That is the key part of the objective to show that it is safe for them to come back to their land, that their land is unoccupied, and that there is love and compassion to them from the majority community of their village. By visiting the healing of the mosque they can have a healing encounter with their home and land as something available to them if they want it.

Also as in the Moluccas, rituals of everyday life like funerals and *halal bi halal*, and kindnesses of everyday life like religious leaders offering rides to poor villagers of the other faith as they struggle along the road, have been important to reconciliation. There have been many hundreds of reconciliation meetings, sometimes large, sometimes small. Again, as in the Moluccas, we heard of no cases where truth and reconciliation occurred. Sometimes survivors' humour was used to skate around the truth. Sometimes lies that outside provocateurs did what was actually done by locals were allowed to push aside the truth. Never did we hear of a reconciliation meeting where a combatant confessed to rape or killing or even burning a building. While non-truth is a weakness of the Poso peace, non-truth and reconciliation seems better than non-truth and non-reconciliation. The Poso data refute Braithwaite's (2005) theory that high-integrity truth-seeking is a fundamental pre-requisite of violence prevention through reconciliation. Truth and reconciliation does not appear in these data as an alternative to proportionality and impunity (that permits superior violence prevention to both proportionality and impunity). In Poso, reconciliation helps secure effective control of religious violence without truth, and in spite of catastrophic failures in the legitimacy, fairness and effectiveness of the courts. This, of course, is not to deny the possibility that non-truth and reconciliation might be a second-best to truth and reconciliation (or a third-best to truth, justice and reconciliation). The *Peacebuilding Compared* project must collect more data from more cases to tease out these possibilities.

A strength of policing in the Poso case is that it networked with religious leaders to negotiate surrender of many combatants and renunciation of the violent part of violent jihad by many terrorists through reconciliatory means. This has involved a deft politics of identity. It was an identity politics that allowed 'terrorists' to be redefined as 'ex-combatants' who are therefore eligible for 'reintegration' programs and benefits. These programs have opened new legitimate opportunities as well as new identities (like businessman, fisherman) as an alternative path to survival through the exploitation of illegitimate opportunities available to those with arms (eg, armed robbery, looting). The police were also in the final analysis willing to back that up with arrest supported by lethal force when they drew the fire of hold-outs. In that final analysis this has restored some of the lost credibility to the police and to the rule of law in Poso. This has been an accomplishment of a sophisticated, thoughtful combination of carrots, sticks and religious persuasion grounded in local knowledge. Mind, there were many unsophisticated and thoughtless feats of enforcement/non-enforcement en route to that destination. Five police living in each village post-conflict has been a large investment in community policing to smother the ignition of new sparks of conflict.

The police and the legal system more broadly continue to be tentative and ineffective in grappling with land and property disputes between returning IDPs and those who used the war to advance longstanding land disputes, including conflicts between land claims transmigrants ground in Indonesian law and indigenes base in adat. These are

fundamental underlying tensions that have not been systematically resolved by transitional or post-conflict justice institutions.

Contests of Principles

Clearly, a key contest was between Islamic and Christian principles, even though jihad and Jesus were harnessed by politically and economically ruthless men only because appeals to their principles accessed the power of religious organizations to mobilise citizens. Still, different kinds of sermons were involved in holy war (defending the faithful and the imperilled faith) and holy peace (loving thine enemies). Maroso was the transcendent principle of 'brotherhood' binding across religious and other divides, including gender.

Partisan alarmist scaremongering versus peace journalism was another contest of principles, present in other case studies of *Peacebuilding Compared* so far, but unusually important in Poso. As in Maluku and North Maluku, gotong royong and reconciliation versus disengaged retreat to the security of one's family was an important contest of principles.

Preliminary Conclusions

The total loss of life in Central Sulawesi was perhaps around a thousand (lower in the estimate of Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeeddin (2004: 30) of deaths to 2003; 2000 in the estimate of Brown and Diprose (2007: 7, 35)). The government estimated in late 2001 7,932 houses and 510 public facilities were burnt or damaged (Human Rights Watch 2002: 38), mostly in Poso district. Actually in a 2007 interview the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Social Affairs said they had rebuilt 14,000 and were in the process of completing another 7000 houses. Not only was loss of life much less than in either Maluku or North Maluku, but also the property damage, terrible as it was, was less than that which occurred in either Maluku or North Maluku. Yet Poso is better known in the West because hard-line Islamic terrorists held out for longer in Poso and there were some international elements involved in the training camps they ran in Poso. The reality, as the International Crisis Group (2005b) points out, was that the dozen or so militias from various parts of Sulawesi and Java that conducted jihad in Poso were more descendants of Darul Islam than al-Qaeda. Most of them were persuaded to return home voluntarily by some rather effective religious diplomacy, as in Maluku (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 2*). It took time, there was considerable injustice and incompetence along the way, but by 2007 law enforcement ultimately proved effective in mopping up the considerable number of hold-out hardliners mostly associated with Jemaah Islamiah.

There is one especially striking difference between Poso and North Maluku. No one was ever prosecuted or imprisoned over the more horrific and widespread violence in North Maluku; yet this impunity has not been a source of resentment going into the future. In Poso, in contrast, perhaps over a hundred people on both sides of the religious conflict over the past decade have begun serving prison terms (or been executed).¹⁶ Yet on both sides in Poso there has been ongoing and extremely deep

¹⁶ McRae's (2007: 80) research suggests over 150 and perhaps closer to 200 went to trial.

resentment that the worst criminals of the other side have not been punished. One NGO described the violence of 2001 in Poso as almost entirely revenge attacks by aggrieved communities (Human Rights Watch 2002: 42). On multiple occasions when alleged lead offenders in the violence have been arrested or charged there have been demonstrations (sometimes of thousands) in solidarity with them. There seem to be three reasons for this distinctiveness of Poso. Initially, the legal system showed extreme bias against Christians in terms of who was arrested and who not. An irony is that many Muslims came to share the widespread view among Christians that the three who were sentenced to death were scapegoats. This was because the Christian defendants chose to defend themselves by producing a list of 16 Christians who were the 'real' generals or planners behind the scenes in the worst attacks on Muslims.

This second contingent difference between North Maluku and Poso fed into the more fundamental difference that the most radical jihadists from across Indonesia did not set up training camps and religious training in North Maluku. One of the reasons they did in Poso was that there was so much resentment there over impunity. A multiplicity of unjust actions by the police, more targeted against the Muslim community in the latter years of the conflict, made things worse. For example, after the 2005 Tentena bombings, which caused the worst loss of life in Indonesia since the Bali bombings, Vice President Kalla set the police a seven day deadline to arrest the perpetrators! The deadline generated more than a dozen arrests of Muslims who ultimately turned out to be innocent (McRae 2008: 227). Perhaps as many as 200 Jemaah Islamiah teachers were able to grow a little power base by amplifying resentment over the injustice of the state. While impunity (as in North Maluku) may be worse than principled justice, it may be a less dangerous option in terms of escalated conflict than law enforcement that comes to be seen by both sides as biased against their group. Some considerable part of the inequitable punishment of suspects was actually a problem of widespread judicial corruption (Human Rights Watch 2002: 44).

Like the conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku (*Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 2*), at its source the Poso conflict may have been significantly about settler-indigene tensions, as opposed to religious ones. It is worth noting that many homes of Hindu transmigrants from Bali, at least one Hindu temple were also destroyed and four of the Balinese transmigrants killed (Irvan 2003), though this incident in 2003 and earlier attacks on Balinese in November 2000 (Veitch 2007: 131) did occur after outside mujahidin had become major players in the violence, so we cannot just assume that indigenous resentments against Balinese migrants were involved. Also as in Maluku and North Maluku with *pela-gandong* and *hibua lamo* respectively, in Poso the indigenous brotherhood institution of *maroso* was also at the heart of how reconciliation was transacted. And the pragmatically dishonest tactic of blaming outside provocateurs for most of the serious wrongdoing is also common ground across these three cases. One of the problems of non-truth and reconciliation based on indigenous traditions of reconciliation is that while inter-religious solidarity among indigenes might well be re-established, this might be done in a way that creates in some ways a deeper divide and distrust between immigrants and indigenes. Many settlers have been wise enough to see this and have therefore adopted or bought into *pela-gandong* in Maluku, *hibua lamo* in Halmahera and *maroso* in Poso. As a result, these indigenous institutions are adapted through violence into more omnibus 'unity

within diversity'¹⁷ institutions for the particular history of one Indonesian place. So perhaps the literature on Poso should give more emphasis than it does to the post-conflict failure of law enforcement in resolving multitudinous micro-conflicts over land between settlers and indigenes. The challenges of reducing the injustice of unjust and unclear land laws, and improving the procedural justice with which distributively unjust laws are administered, seem ever present after armed conflict and usually poorly tackled.

Methodological Conclusions

Two Australian National University PhDs, one on North Maluku by Chris Wilson (2006), one on Poso by Dave McRae (2008), converge on pointing to a tendency in the literature to identify dominant drivers and characteristics of a conflict from those that prevail either at its peak or its onset. The factors that cause a conflict may be quite different from those that sustain it, and those that diminish it may have nothing to do with the factors that produced it. The characteristics of the long Poso conflict are very different at different stages. First, escalating riots without guns. Then, attacks led by semi-trained militias joined by large crowds with home-made guns. Then, furtive bombings of markets, buses and buildings and targeted assassinations. Motivations shifted from local political ambitions when those with the vaulting ambitions were discredited and fled (or were killed) to predominantly motivations of revenge. Indigene-settler cleavages that were important early on, in time were swamped by a religious cleavage that JI agitators persisted in prising open. While all the Chinese families were driven from Poso town once or twice during this conflict and many had their homes or businesses burnt and looted once or twice,¹⁸ anti-Chinese sentiment did not have the importance as a narrative of this conflict that it has had in most of our first set of 11 conflicts. Nevertheless, our interviews suggested it had some subsidiary presence. A first methodological lesson from Wilson (2006) and McRae (2008) is to attempt to tell the entire narrative without suppressing complexity concerning the changing and multiplex drivers and features of the fighting.

A second lesson for the *Peacebuilding Compared* project is that if religion is a key cleavage at one stage of the conflict and ethnicity at another, then the project must code both as key cleavages. This is a different coding practice from extant quantitative research on civil war which forces cases into single categories – this is a separatist conflict (never mind that Chinese are ethnically cleansed from a town along the way), that is an ethnic conflict, this is a religious conflict. While coding always abstracts from the complexity of narrative, some coding strategies are more reductionist and uncompromising than others. Comparative method can draw useful inferences where a large number of cases suggest an explanatory factor is a plausibly possible explanation, even if in each of those cases the regional experts strongly disagree on the validity of the explanation. The imperative of the regionalist is to engage with these contests to argue for why their preferred set of explanatory factors is the right one. The comparativist, in contrast, can be more interested in probabilistic induction, wherein many factors, as in Appendix 3.1, can be coded as ‘contested but

¹⁷ This is a reference to the Indonesian national motto to that effect.

¹⁸ Sijabat (2003) reports one non-Chinese case of a refugee in Tentena who had built three houses since the beginning of the conflict only to see each of them burned down.

credible,’ with a less authoritative status than ‘consensus’ factors. It is a better comparativism to code systematically all the ‘contested but credible’ explanations than to be the kind of comparativist who picks and chooses from the favoured interpretations of the regional experts that vindicate the comparativist’s theoretical predispositions. The serious comparativist, however, must engage sufficiently with the detail of each case to be able to make evidence-based judgements on what are ‘non-credible and contested’ explanations, because war zones are rife with wild rumours that give birth to them!

Appendix 3.1: Summary of some codes, Central Sulawesi. Over 500 other variables are coded.

Structural factors at root of conflict	‘Consensus’ among analysts that this was a factor or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?
Colonialism of long duration stunts institutions, opens horizontal inequalities, disrupts trading relationships	Contested but credible
High proportion of jobs are in urban public sector, fostering competition to control patronage (van Klinken 2007)	Contested but credible
Transmigration/immigration	Consensus
Proximate factors	
Asian Financial Crisis exacerbates religious group competition for scarce legitimate opportunities. Poverty increases.	Consensus
Collapse of New Order lays power allocations and the rules of the game open for religious competition (Bertrand 2004)	Contested but credible
Political decentralisation increases religiously-based patronage opportunities, further increasing politico-religious competition	Contested but credible
Indecisiveness in deployment of security forces to protect civilians	Consensus
Religious bias and perceived inconsistency in law enforcement against militias	Consensus
Security vacuum fuels a security dilemma, driving both communities into the hands of militias for protection	Consensus
Inflammatory, religiously segregated media	Consensus
Key triggering incidents	

Minor fights in public space	Consensus
Key Warmaking Actors	
District political and business leaders playing the religion card motivated by greed and criminal intent in capturing district government offices	Consensus
Many local and imported militias (such as Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Jihad)	Consensus
Jemaah Islamiyah religious leaders advocating and channelling funds to jihad	Consensus
Key Peacemaking Actors	
Religious leaders	Consensus
Adat leaders	Consensus
IDP, village, women, youth and NGO leaders	Consensus
Ministers Kalla and Yudoyono	Consensus
Peace journalists	Contested but credible
Peacebuilding strengths	
Local dialogue and reconciliation using adat, normal rituals of everyday life, mutual humanitarian and reconstruction help.	Consensus
Central, provincial and district governments owning responsibility for security by leading Malino I peace agreement	Consensus
Increased deployment of security forces and a new decisiveness in sending combatants home, arresting them and seizing weapons. More than 100 war criminals imprisoned.	Consensus
Sophisticated multidimensional strategy of religious persuasion, carrots and sticks for various jihadist groups to withdraw/surrender. Proferring exchange of 'ex-combatant' identity for 'terrorist' identity.	Contested but credible
Final ultimatums and capture of most terrorist hold-outs through force in January 2007	Consensus
Security forces provide guarantees to combatants weary of fighting who hand in weapons	Contested but credible
Fairly quick resettlement of IDPs with support for building houses from	Consensus

government and international donors	
New informal norms to balance Muslims with Christians on political party slates	Contested but credible
Improved integration of top-down with bottom-up planning which gave villages, then subdistricts, then districts, then the province a chance to plan budget priorities in a conflict-sensitive way. World Bank and UNDP leadership to assist with this.	Contested but credible
Military involvement in gotong royong rebuilding houses in a way that gave them a stake in peace	Contested but credible
Community values of post-conflict religious tolerance	Contested but credible
Indigenous reconciliation traditions reinvigorated post-conflict	Contested but credible
Peacebuilding weaknesses	
Security forces indecisiveness during the early stages in establishing roadblocks, stopping combatants, preventing outside militias from arriving, seizing weapons and protecting civilians	Contested but credible
Early religious bias in prosecutions and later inconsistency, summary executions and perceived unwillingness to prosecute elite players	Consensus
Failure of community policing and the courts to deploy rule of law or adat to resolve disputes over opportunistic land grabs during conflict	Consensus
Corruption and embezzlement in local government	Consensus
Governmental and intergovernmental disengagement. National, provincial and district governments pass the buck on tackling the conflict in the early stages. No international engagement.	Consensus
Religious leader advocacy of peace collapses as the height of the conflict (but returns post-conflict)	Consensus
Weak NGO sector in Poso	Consensus
Limited access to trauma counselling for victims and combatants	Consensus
Reconciliation but no truth	Consensus
Malino peace process top-down and	Consensus

lacking in participatory follow-through and resources	
Key contested principles of peacebuilding	
Violent versus non-violent jihad. On both sides, holy war versus holy peace	Consensus
Interfaith dialogue and reconciliation	Consensus
Peace journalism versus partisan alarmist scaremongering in journalism	Contested but credible
Maroso	Contested but credible

Appendix 3.2: Numbers and types of people interviewed, Central Sulawesi Case

Elected Official, Legislator/MPR/Bupati	1
Civil Servant	10
Political leader of oppositional group	0
Military	2
Police	7
Combatant	1
Adat/Indigenous/Village Leader	2
Religious leader	1
Women's NGO	4
Environmental NGO	1
Development NGO	1
Human Rights/Peacebuilding NGO	8
Other NGO	1
Journalist	4
Business leader	0
Student/youth leader	2
Foreign Govt (Ambassador, Foreign Minister of another country, USAID etc)	0
International Organizations	3
Researcher/university academic	2
Victim/IDP	3
Other	0
Total interviews	36
Total people interviewed	53

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